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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines how the prevailing legal conception of privacy 
facilitates the erosion of privacy.  The law generally measures privacy 
by reference to society’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  If we think 
of the universe of legally private matters as a sphere, the sphere will 
contract or (at least in theory) expand in accordance with changing 
social expectations.  This expectation-driven conception of privacy in 
effect establishes a privacy marketplace, analogous in both a literal and 
metaphorical sense to a marketplace of ideas.  In this marketplace, 
societal expectations of privacy fluctuate in response to changing social 
practices.  For this reason, privacy is susceptible to encroachment at the 
hands of large institutional actors who can control this marketplace by 
affecting social practices. 
This Article also identifies two essential elements of the erosion of 
privacy: embedded imprecision and internalization.  We find imprecision 
embedded in the expectation-driven conception of privacy because of 
the inevitable gray area between what society clearly expects to be 
protected (that is, private), and what it clearly understands to be 
unprotected.  Effective encroachment occurs through incremental 
incursions into this gray area of unsettled expectations.  Moreover, 
individuals internalize each incremental step of encroachment, and 
thereby lose any sense that privacy was once possible in the encroached 
upon area.  Because of this internalization, the expectation-driven 
privacy test cannot account for the cumulative effect of successive 
encroachments.  Instead, its focus on the current level of expectations 
facilitates the incremental erosion of privacy. 
Finally, this Article examines pervasive failures in the literal and 
metaphorical privacy marketplaces.  Given the expectation-driven 
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vulnerability discussed above, preservation of privacy depends upon the 
individual’s ability to resist encroachment into the private sphere.  
However, informational asymmetry, unequal bargaining power, and 
collective action problems conspire against them in both the economic 
and political marketplaces.  Equally problematic are the inevitable 
unintended consequences that flow from any single encroachment.  
These phenomena stack the deck against those who would preserve the 
private sphere, and in favor of those who benefit from its erosion.  
Without some structural changes to restore the balance, the erosion of 
privacy may be a foregone conclusion. 
Several caveats are appropriate at the outset.  First, the term “privacy” 
means different things to different people.  To clarify, this Article refers 
to what many call “information privacy,” rather than the fundamental 
personal autonomy to which others have affixed the privacy label.1  Alan 
Westin provided the classic definition of information privacy—the claim 
of individuals or groups to determine the conditions under which 
information about themselves is communicated to others.2  Furthermore, 
the terms “public sector” and “private sector” risk introducing the notion 
of information privacy where it does not belong.  This Article therefore 
 
 1. For discussions of information privacy, see Hyman Gross, Privacy and 
Autonomy, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 169, 170 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman 
eds., 1971) (suggesting that privacy includes limits on what is known and who may 
know about one’s personal affairs); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); 
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968) (stating that privacy is control over 
personal information about oneself); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2000) [herinafter Froomkin, Death of Privacy?] (suggesting 
that privacy is “the ability to control the acquisition or release of information about 
oneself”).  Others consider privacy a broader interest that includes informational privacy 
but encompasses far more.  See JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 91 
(1992) (explaining that privacy is control over one’s intimate decisions, including 
decisions about physical access to oneself, cognitive access to oneself, and intimate 
behaviors); A. Michael Froomkin, Regulation and Computing and Information 
Technology: Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital 
Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 493 (1996) (“The constitutional 
right to privacy, such as it is, is frequently described as having three components: (1) a 
right to be left alone; (2) a right to autonomous choice regarding intimate matters; and 
(3) a right to autonomous choice regarding other personal matters.”).  The United States 
Supreme Court noted two senses of privacy in its own decisions.  See Whalen v. Roe, 
429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977) (noting that the Court had applied the “privacy” label to 
two different kinds of interests: (1) the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters,” and (2) the “interest in independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions”). 
 2. WESTIN, supra note 1, at 7. 
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avoids the terms wherever possible.3 
This Article sometimes refers to a “sphere” of privacy that can expand 
or contract, while recognizing that one cannot formally quantify privacy 
in this fashion, because the term “privacy” lacks substance when 
divorced from a specific social context.  Terms suggesting a measurable 
sphere of privacy that we can observe expanding or shrinking are 
intended only to convey the sense that matters once considered private 
can subsequently lose that status, and vice versa. 
Finally, the purpose here is not to argue for or against specific 
practices.4  Although many specific surveillance techniques or data 
collection practices are mentioned, this is primarily to illustrate their role 
in shaping expectations of privacy.  Many of the practices mentioned 
below will find proponents and opponents, each with differing views on 
whether the practices invade a reasonable expectation of privacy.  In 
fact, that split of opinion illustrates the imprecision embedded in the 
expectation-driven conception of privacy.  Society will inevitably 
disagree about whether certain matters should be protected as private, 
and the incremental erosion of privacy occurs in this gray area of 
unsettled expectations. 
II.  THE EXPECTATION-DRIVEN CONCEPTION OF PRIVACY 
The following Section discusses the role of social expectations in 
privacy law.  Courts protect privacy mainly in the invasion of privacy 
torts and the Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence.  In 
each area, courts define privacy by reference to society’s prevailing 
understanding of what is a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Because 
this conception of privacy tracks societal expectations, what is protected 
as private will vary in accordance with relevant social changes.  For 
example, we generally expect that what we do and say in our homes 
 
 3. This linguistic contrast between public and private may trace its roots to the 
Greek and Roman distinctions between the public sphere (affairs of state) and the 
private sphere (affairs of domestic life).  See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 3–4 (Thomas Burger trans., 1989) (contrasting 
the Greek political sphere of the polis, where citizens pursued freedom, honor and virtue, 
with the domestic sphere of the oikos, to which the labor of slaves and the service of 
women were consigned); see also HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 38 (1958) 
(explaining that for the Greeks and Romans the private sphere connoted incompleteness 
and deprivation from the fulfillment of the public realm). 
 4. This Article proceeds on the assumption that, in many contexts, we ought to 
protect privacy against encroachment.  Not everyone shares that assumption.  See, e.g., 
Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 393–99 (1978) (arguing 
that personal privacy is generally inefficient because it allows people to conceal 
“discreditable information” from others and to shift the cost of information acquisition to 
those who are not the least-cost avoiders).  Enough commentators have come to the 
defense of privacy, however; this Article needs not join that debate. 
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remains private.  If, however, people outside our homes were free to use 
devices that could sense our body heat through our walls or amplify 
sound waves bouncing against our windows, we might have a very 
different expectation of privacy in our homes.5  The final Section in this 
Part examines how successive, incremental encroachments gradually 
erode societal expectations of privacy. 
A.  The Judicial Conception of Privacy 
In the United States, judicial protection of privacy depends on whether 
an individual has a reasonable expectation that the information in 
question will remain private.  Stated another way, the question is 
whether society recognizes the individual’s claimed expectation of 
privacy as reasonable.  Courts apply this reasonableness standard in the 
two broad areas of judicial privacy protection: the Fourth Amendment 
protection against unreasonable search and seizure, and the invasion of 
privacy torts. 
1.  Fourth Amendment Protection of Privacy 
The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable search and 
seizure incorporates societal expectations.  In Katz v. United States,6 the 
Supreme Court held that a person speaking on a public telephone had a 
justifiable expectation of privacy in his conversation, and that the 
government violated his expectation by wiretapping the telephone.7  In 
an oft-cited concurrence, Justice Harlan explained that “reasonableness” 
entailed a two-part, expectation-driven test.  First, the defendant must 
have an actual or subjective expectation of privacy.  Second, the 
expectation must be “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”8 
 
 5. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that law 
enforcement’s use of a thermal imaging device to scan heat radiating from the 
defendant’s home violated a reasonable expectation of privacy because technology was 
not in general public use); JARVIS INT’L INTELLIGENCE, INC., LASER MICROPHONE, at 
http://www.jarvisinternational.com/lasermic.htm (offering a “short range laser microphone 
that allows you to listen in on certain rooms and buildings from 150 yards away” by 
using lasers and receivers to amplify sound waves reflected against interior windows) 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2002). 
 6. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 7. Id. at 353. 
 8. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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The Supreme Court elaborated on this expectation-driven conception 
of privacy in O’Connor v. Ortega.9  A state hospital searched a doctor’s 
desk drawers and personal file cabinets during a sexual harassment 
investigation.  Investigators seized the doctor’s personal letters and 
photographs.10  The doctor filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
the hospital, and alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.11  
Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality opinion, which held that the 
plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment.12  
Discussing the Fourth Amendment “reasonable expectation” test, Justice 
O’Connor wrote: 
The operational realities of the workplace, however, may make some 
employees’ expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion is by a 
supervisor rather than a law enforcement official.  Public employees’ expectations of 
privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations of 
employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office 
practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation.13 
By positing actual official practices and procedures and operational 
realities of the workplace as limits on whether an expectation of privacy 
was reasonable, the Court recognized the role of social context in 
determining the scope of privacy.  As Frederick Schauer observed, the 
Fourth Amendment test does not involve a fixed moral conception of 
what ought to be private, nor does it involve application of a formal legal 
test.  Instead, courts “look at society as it is and . . . look at what society 
now thinks of as an area that is understood as a sanctuary.”14  Ortega 
shows that this social understanding “is itself inevitably dependent on 
changing social values and changing social expectations.”15 
The Court’s reasoning in Kyllo v. United States16 illustrates how 
changing technology can dictate the reasonable expectation of privacy.  
The Court held that law enforcement’s warrantless use of a thermal 
imaging device to scan the defendant’s house constituted a presumptively 
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.17  Scanning the 
defendant’s home from across the street revealed that portions of the 
house were unusually hot, which was consistent with the use of heat 
 
 9. 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
 10. Id. at 713. 
 11. Id. at 714. 
 12. Id. at 728–29. 
 13. Id. at 717. 
 14. Frederick Schauer, The Social Construction of Privacy, Discussion Draft 10 
(Mar. 20, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/presspol/ 
publications/pdfs/schauer1.PDF). 
 15. See id. 
 16. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 17. See id. at 40. 
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lamps to grow marijuana.18  Relying in part on the thermal imaging scan, 
the law enforcement officer obtained a search warrant and found that the 
defendant was, in fact, growing marijuana in his house.19  The district 
court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found in 
his house, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.20 
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia held that the use of the thermal 
imaging device constituted a presumptively unreasonable search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.21  Scalia relied heavily on the 
fact that thermal imaging technology was “not in general public use.”22  
He contrasted the thermal imaging device with widely used technologies 
such as airplane and helicopter flight, which have opened to public view 
areas of the “house and curtilage that once were private.”23  The logical 
conclusion of this reasoning is that, if thermal imaging technology finds 
its way into general public use, there may no longer be a reasonable 
expectation of privacy against such technology.24 
Several United States Supreme Court decisions rest on the assumption 
that individuals cannot reasonably expect privacy in information they 
share voluntarily with others, like their bank25 or their telephone 
 
 18. Id. at 30. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.  A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit originally reversed the district court, 
see United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249, 1250 (9th Cir. 1998), but on rehearing the still 
divided panel (after a change in composition) affirmed the district court, see United 
States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1999).  The second panel reasoned that the 
defendant had no subjective expectation of privacy because he did not try to conceal the 
heat radiating from his home.  190 F.3d at 1046. 
 21. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
 22. See id. at 34. 
 23. See id. at 34.  For cases finding no unreasonable search based on warrantless 
aerial observations, see Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989) (observation of 
partially exposed residential greenhouse from helicopter at altitude of 400 feet); Dow 
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986) (aerial photography of industrial 
plant from between 1200 and 12,000 feet); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 
(1986) (surveillance of fenced-in backyard from helicopter at altitude of 1000 feet). 
 24. Some may consider it unlikely that such a highly specialized technology would 
become widely used.  The same might have been said of global positioning system 
(GPS) technology when it was a purely military application, or of long distance laser 
microphones that amplify sound waves radiating against the inside of a window.  Today, 
GPS technology has widespread public applications, and laser microphones are available 
for sale to the public.  See Sabra Chartrand, Patents: Tapping Global Positioning 
Technology to Send an S.O.S., Raise Drawbridges and Monitor Workouts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 5, 2001, at C6; Jarvis Int’l Intelligence, Inc., Laser Microphone, at 
http://www.jarvisinternational.com/lasermic.htm (offering laser microphone for sale) 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2002). 
 25. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (holding that a bank 
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company.26  Some state courts, however, have disagreed with this 
assumption.  In Burrows v. Superior Court,27 the California Supreme 
Court held that customers had a reasonable expectation that information 
shared with their bank would remain private.  The court based its 
holding in part on testimony by bank officials and customers that 
customers expected their bank records to be used for internal bank 
purposes only.28 
The Burrows court and the United States Supreme Court  applied 
similar tests but reached different results concerning bank customers’ 
expectations of privacy.  This could reflect the California Supreme 
Court’s greater emphasis on empirical evidence of expectations than the 
Supreme Court.29  On the other hand, it may be appropriate for the 
expectation-driven conception of privacy to vary from state to state, 
presumably reflecting the different customs or norms in each state. 
In this regard, the expectation-driven conception of privacy places the 
Supreme Court in a rather difficult position.  On Fourth Amendment 
privacy questions, the Court must discern (or declare) the values and 
expectations of the national community.  Any statement of the prevailing 
values and expectations will inevitably conflict with the values and 
expectations held in a minority of state and local communities.  Perhaps 
the best way to deal with this problem is for the Supreme Court’s 
privacy jurisprudence to serve merely as a baseline, recognizing only the 
 
depositor had no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records because depositor 
voluntarily conveyed checks and deposit slips to bank employees). 
 26. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (holding that a telephone 
customer had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed because the 
act of dialing exposes those numbers to the telephone company); see also United States 
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971) (finding no legitimate expectation that the 
defendant’s accomplices would not report the defendant’s statements to the police). 
 27. 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974). 
 28. See id. at 593 (“For all practical purposes, the disclosure by individuals or 
business firms of their financial affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is 
impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary society without 
maintaining a bank account.”); accord Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117, 1120–21 
(Colo. 1980) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records under the 
Colorado constitution); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1291 (Pa. 1979) 
(finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records under the Pennsylvania 
constitution). 
 29. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations 
of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at 
“Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 737 (1993).  
Slobogin and Schumacher surveyed nearly two hundred individuals about their 
expectations of privacy.  They asked citizens to rank fifty government searches in 
ascending order (one being least offensive and fifty being most offensive) of how much 
the searches intruded on their expectation of privacy.  The results placed “perusing bank 
records” in thirty-eighth place, more intrusive than such searches as using a chauffeur or 
secretary as undercover agents, and slightly less intrusive than urinalysis.  Id. at 737–38 
tbl. 1, 742. 
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most broadly accepted privacy expectations.  This approach would then 
allow states to build additional privacy protection upon that foundation, 
when local values and expectations dictate greater protection than the 
Supreme Court has established.  Such a model depends on state supreme 
courts treating their constitutional protections against unreasonable 
search and seizure as truly independent from the federal provision, rather 
than interpreting their constitutional protections as duplicative of the 
federal protection.30  Without this independent state protection, the Supreme 
Court’s nationally applicable definition of what is private will serve as a 
ceiling rather than a floor, and will therefore diminish the expectation of 
privacy in those communities whose expectations differ from the 
majority.  One alternative is for the Supreme Court to import a 
“contemporary community standards” test into its already involved 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable search and seizure.31  Such an approach would either make 
the Court an arbiter of local norms in hundreds or even thousands of 
localities, or would relegate the Court to a minor role at best in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
2.  Tort Law Protection of Privacy 
The invasion of privacy tort traces its roots to Warren and Brandeis’ 
seminal law review article.32  In response to the late nineteenth century 
 
 30. See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the 
New Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 97 (2000) (arguing that the 
values of federalism and dialogue support independent state court interpretation of state 
constitutional provisions that parallel federal constitutional provisions). 
 31. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973): 
Under a National Constitution, fundamental First Amendment limitations on 
the powers of the States do not vary from community to community, but this 
does not mean that there are, or should or can be, fixed, uniform national 
standards of precisely what appeals to the “prurient interest” or is “patently 
offensive.”  These are essentially questions of fact, and our Nation is simply 
too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards 
could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the 
prerequisite consensus exists.  When triers of fact are asked to decide whether 
“the average person, applying contemporary community standards” would 
consider certain materials “prurient,” it would be unrealistic to require that the 
answer be based on some abstract formulation . . . .  To require a State to 
structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national “community 
standard” would be an exercise in futility. 
 32. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 
75, 76 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed. 1984) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS 
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version of tabloid journalism, Warren and Brandeis argued for explicit 
common law recognition of an invasion of privacy tort to “protect the 
privacy of the individual from invasion either by the too enterprising 
press, the photographer, or the possessor of any other modern device for 
recording or reproducing scenes or sounds.”33  Over the next seven 
decades, most states adopted some version of Warren and Brandies’ 
privacy tort.34  In 1960, Prosser’s article reshaped the law of privacy.  
Prosser examined the common law privacy decisions in the wake of the 
Warren and Brandeis article, and argued that the decisions in fact dealt 
with invasions of four different interests.35  Prosser’s four interests are 
codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652B-652E.36 
 
OF PRIVACY].  W. A. Parent suggests, as have many others, that Warren and Brandeis 
equated privacy with the right to be let alone.  W. A. Parent, Recent Work on the 
Concept of Privacy, 20 AM. PHIL. Q. 341, 341 (1983).  In fact, Warren and Brandeis 
described privacy as merely a part of a larger right, which they referred to alternately as 
the “right to be let alone,” and the “more general right to the immunity of the person,—
the right to one’s personality.”  Warren & Brandeis, supra, at 75, 83. 
 33. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 32, at 82. 
 34. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960), reprinted in 
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 32, at 106, 106. 
 35. Prosser, supra note 34, at 107. 
 36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B–652E (1977).  Omitted from 
this discussion are the torts for misappropriation of name or likeness and “false light” 
invasion of privacy, sections 652C and 652E, because neither implicates information 
privacy.  As defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the misappropriation tort is 
more accurately characterized as protecting an interest in property or reputation, rather 
than privacy.  See id. § 652C, cmt. c (stating that to be liable for misappropriation, “the 
defendant must have appropriated to his own use or benefit the reputation, prestige, 
social or commercial standing, public interest or other values of the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness . . . .  Until the value of the name has in some way been appropriated, there is no 
tort.”); accord Prosser, supra note 34, at 104, 116–17 (arguing that the appropriation tort 
protects a proprietary interest in the exclusive use of one’s name or likeness).  Some 
commentators argue that misappropriation implicates privacy interests, but those 
arguments rest on the assertion that misappropriation can effect the same type of 
dignitary harm as invasion of information privacy.  See, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, 
Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
962 (1964), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 32, at 156, 
175, 178–79 (arguing that appropriation of one’s name or likeness has the same tendency 
to degrade and humiliate the victim as the publication of private facts, and that the 
privacy torts all protect human dignity and individuality); Hyman Gross, The Concept of 
Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34 (1967) (arguing that the gravamen of the appropriation 
tort is not harm to a proprietary interest, but harm to the victim’s sensibility).  Though I 
agree that misappropriation and invasions of information privacy can effect similar 
dignitary harm, they do so through quite different mechanisms.  Misappropriation 
involves neither an intrusion into an area from which the victim reasonably expected to 
exclude others, nor a disclosure of information that the victim kept secret from others.  
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C, cmt. d (1976).  
No one has the right to object merely because his name or his appearance is 
brought before the public, since neither is in any way a private matter and both 
are open to public observation.  It is only when the publicity is given for the 
purpose of appropriating to the defendant’s benefit the commercial or other 
values associated with the name or the likeness that the right of privacy is invaded. 
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts claims protect against intrusion and 
eavesdropping on one’s “seclusion,”37 and disclosure of one’s private 
information.38  These claims are based expressly on what constitutes 
reasonable behavior.  Intrusions on seclusion are not actionable unless 
the intrusion “would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”39  
Conduct is highly offensive when a reasonable person “would strongly 
object” to the conduct.40  Similarly, a disclosure of private facts is not 
actionable unless it “would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.”41  The Restatement (Second) of Torts commentary specifies that 
the disclosure is not actionably offensive unless the disclosure “is such 
that a reasonable person would feel justified in feeling seriously 
aggrieved by it.”42  The reasonableness test is to be judged “relative to 
the customs of the time and place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and 
to the habits of his neighbors and fellow citizens.”43 
The reasonable person standard incorporates society’s expectations of 
what matters should be protected as private.  As Frederick Schauer 
observed, the harm that underlies the privacy torts is a socially 
constructed harm.44  The law cares not about harm to the plaintiff’s own 
sensibilities.  Instead, the actionable harm is “a function of going beyond 
what most of the people in the society have come to expect, so if those 
expectations change, then so too does the conception of harm that is 
based upon them.”45  Similarly, Robert Post conceived of the reasonable 
person standard as “a genuine instantiation of community norms” which 
does not focus on injuries to specific individuals’ personalities, but 
 
Id.  Indeed, torts such as battery and defamation inflict dignitary harms, but that does not 
render them privacy torts. 
Similarly, the “false light” tort protects against harm to reputation and largely overlaps 
with defamation.  See Prosser, supra note 34, at 114; cf. Bloustein, supra, at 156, 178–79 
(agreeing that false light cases involve reputation, but arguing that the slur on reputation 
involves a slur on individual integrity characteristic of the other privacy torts).  Indeed, 
nothing in the Restatement (Second) of Torts formulation of the false light tort requires 
the disclosure of any private information.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E & 
cmt. a (1977). 
 37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 38. See id. at § 652D. 
 39. Id. at § 652B. 
 40. Id. at § 652B cmt. d. 
 41. Id. at § 652D(a). 
 42. Id. at § 652D cmt. c. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Schauer, supra note 14, at 3. 
 45. Id. at 10. 
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instead upholds social rules of “deference and demeanor,” which Post 
called “civility rules.”46  Both Schauer and Post recognized, then, that 
the tort law conception of privacy incorporates society’s expectation of 
privacy. 
Courts applying the expectation-driven privacy test focus on the 
context of the alleged intrusion and the social norms and customs that 
determine whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable.  In Shulman 
v. Group W Productions, Inc.,47 a helicopter medical crew rescued the  
plaintiffs from a car that drove off a highway.  Accompanying the crew 
was a television  cameraman.  The cameraman filmed the medical team 
rescuing the plaintiffs from the car and transporting them to the hospital 
in a rescue helicopter, and a helicopter nurse’s microphone recorded 
conversations with one of the plaintiffs.  The videotape and soundtrack 
were used months later in a television show.  The plaintiffs never 
consented to the broadcast and sued the television producers for invasion 
of privacy.48  Specifically, the plaintiffs sued under California’s 
common-law equivalent of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B, 
intrusion on seclusion.49 
To evaluate the plaintiffs’ privacy claims, the court examined the 
prevailing social practices and legislative expressions relevant to the 
expectation of privacy under the circumstances.50  First, the court 
examined current media practices and rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that 
filming them at the accident scene was an intrusion on seclusion.  The 
plaintiffs could not have reasonably expected that the media would be 
prevented from filming the accident scene, because journalists 
commonly film accident scenes and rescues.51  The court supported this 
conclusion by citing California statutes that exempt the press from 
certain emergency closure orders.52  Apparently, the court interpreted 
this exemption as an expression of societal approval for the media 
 
 46. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and the Self in 
the Common Law Tort Law, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 961–63 (1989); accord Richard S. 
Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 
GEO. L.J. 2381, 2393 (1996) (“The [privacy] tort invokes objective norms of civility and 
punishes breaches of civility.”). 
 47. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998). 
 48. Id. at 475–76. 
 49. Id. at 489–90.  The plaintiffs also sued for public disclosure of private facts.  
The court rejected this claim because the published sounds and images were of 
legitimate public concern and therefore could not support a claim for disclosure of 
private facts.  Id. at 488–89; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) 
(stating that there is no liability for publicizing private facts if the facts are of legitimate 
concern to the public). 
 50. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 488–89. 
 51. Id. at 490. 
 52. Id. (citing CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 409.5(d)–.6(d) (West 2002)). 
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reporting on and broadcasting scenes of accidents. 
Next, however, the court held that filming the plaintiffs inside the 
rescue helicopter could constitute an intrusion upon seclusion.53  The 
court based its decision on both law and custom.  “Although the 
attendance of reporters and photographers at the scene of an accident is 
to be expected, we are aware of no law or custom permitting the press to 
ride in ambulances or enter hospital rooms during treatment without the 
patient’s consent.”54  The court noted that it was “neither the custom nor 
the habit of our society that any member of the public at large or its 
media representatives may hitch a ride in an ambulance and ogle as 
paramedics care for an injured stranger.”55 
The court also held that recording the plaintiffs’ communications with 
the rescue nurse could constitute an intrusion upon seclusion, and 
therefore denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on that 
claim.56  The court again based its conclusion on social customs and 
norms reflected in existing law.  Because the accident occurred “in a 
ditch many yards from and below the rural superhighway,” it was 
extremely unlikely that any passersby on the road could have overheard 
the conversations.57  The court also noted “existing legal protections for 
communications could support the conclusion that [the plaintiff] 
possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in her conversations with 
[the nurse] and the other rescuers.”58  The court cited the physician-
patient privilege codified in the California Evidence Code and the 
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, as well as the California 
Invasion of Privacy Act’s prohibition of recording any confidential 
communication without the consent of all parties.59 
The court considered the implications of established custom and 
norms on whether the intrusion could be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.  The court contrasted established reporting techniques, such as 
questioning people who know confidential information, with techniques 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 490. 
 55. Id. at 491 (quoting the court of appeal decision, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 434, 453 (Ct. 
App. 1996)). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 491–92 (citing California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, 
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56–56.37 (West 2002); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 990–1007 (West 2002); 
California Invasion of Privacy Act, CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 630–637.6 (West 2002)). 
FINALSPENCER.DOC 2/11/2020  2:49 PM 
 
856 
that intrude upon “well-established legal areas of physical or sensory 
privacy—trespass into a home or tapping a personal telephone line.”60  
The latter are much more likely to be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person because they are substantially harder to justify.61  The court also 
noted that courts should consider the purpose of the intrusion, and 
suggested that a reasonable person’s measure of offensiveness might 
depend on whether the intruder was a reporter or a debt collector.62  This 
evaluation reflects a social judgment about the relative importance of the 
functions that different social actors serve.63  Thus, the Shulman court 
relied heavily on social norms, as reflected in custom and law, to apply 
the expectation-driven privacy test. 
The Idaho Supreme Court undertook a similarly expectation-based 
inquiry in Hoskins v. Howard.64  The plaintiffs sued for invasion of 
privacy based on interception of their cordless telephone conversation.65  
Vacating the district court’s entry of summary judgment for the 
defendants, the Idaho Supreme Court held that there was a genuine issue 
as to whether the plaintiffs had a legitimate expectation of privacy.66  
The court reasoned that an Idaho antiwiretapping statute established 
society’s desire to preserve an expectation of privacy in wire 
communications, including cordless telephone conversations.67 
Finally, in Lewis v. Dayton Hudson Corp.,68 a Michigan court found 
no reasonable expectation of privacy where a sign notified shoppers in 
retail store fitting rooms that they were under surveillance.  An 
 
 60. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 494. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 493. 
 63. See id. at 493–94.  The court held that “a reasonable jury could find highly 
offensive the placement of a microphone on a medical rescuer in order to intercept what 
would otherwise be private conversations with an injured patient.”  Id. at 494.  The court 
reasoned: 
[T]he patient would not know her words were being recorded and would not 
have occasion to ask about, and object or consent to, recording.  Defendants, it 
could reasonably be said, took calculated advantage of the patient’s 
“vulnerability and confusion.”  Arguably, the last thing an injured accident 
victim should have to worry about while being pried from her wrecked car is 
that a television producer may be recording everything she says to medical 
personnel for the possible edification and entertainment of casual television 
viewers. 
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 679 (Ct. 
App. 1986)). 
 64. 971 P.2d 1135 (Idaho 1998). 
 65. Id. at 1140. 
 66. Id. at 1141–42. 
 67. See id. at 1138–39, 1142 (holding that the cordless telephone conversation 
constituted a “wire communication” under the statute) (citing the Idaho Communications 
Security Act, IDAHO CODE § 18-6701–18-6709 (Michie 1997)). 
 68. 339 N.W.2d 857 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). 
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undercover police officer, who happened to be shopping in the store, 
entered the fitting room to try on clothes, and put down his gun while he 
was changing.  A security guard monitoring the room saw the gun and 
the police were called.69  The court rejected the undercover officer’s 
invasion of privacy claim because a sign in the fitting room warned that 
the area was under surveillance, and removed any reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the dressing room.70 
B.  The Legislative Conception of Privacy 
From one perspective, the legislative approach to privacy seems quite 
different from the judicial conception.  For the most part, legislatures 
pass specific statutes that fix particular matters or circumstances as 
private.  Once such a statute exists, there is no need to refer to social 
expectations to determine whether matters encompassed by the statute 
should be private.71  For example, in the wake of the controversial 
 
 69. Id. at 858. 
 70. Id. at 860; see also Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).  
One who invites another to his home or office takes a risk that the visitor may 
not be what he seems, and that the visitor may repeat all he hears and observes 
when he leaves.  But he does not and should not be required to take the risk 
that what is heard and seen will be transmitted by photograph or recording, or 
in our modern world, in full living color and hi-fi to the public at large . . . . 
Id.; Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir.1969) (finding that the intrusion tort 
protects against intrusion “whether by physical trespass or not, into spheres from which 
an ordinary man in a plaintiff’s position could reasonably expect that the particular 
defendant should be excluded”); Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 
1135–36 (Alaska 1989) (“[T]here is a sphere of activity in every person’s life that is 
closed to scrutiny by others.  The boundaries of that sphere are determined by balancing 
a person’s right to privacy against other public policies.”); Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 
978 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1999) (“There are degrees and nuances to societal recognition of 
our expectations of privacy.”); Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d 1060, 1068–71 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a medical intern had areasonable expectation of 
privacy against a hospital performing an unconsented-to HIV test on a blood sample 
(given for purpose of testing for rubella), because of the generally recognized privacy 
interest in information concerning one’s health, Colorado statutes restricting access to 
one’s medical records, and Colorado statutes requiring express consent before testing for 
HIV); People of Colorado v. Lesslie, 939 P.2d 443, 446 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (stating 
that a reasonable expectation of privacy requires balancing a person’s actual expectation 
of privacy in an area against society’s willingness objectively to recognize the 
reasonableness of that expectation). 
 71. Some statutes, however, explicitly incorporate the expectation-driven 
conception of privacy.  See, e.g., California’s so-called anti-paparazzi legislation, CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (Deering 1994 & Supp. 2002). 
A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the defendant 
attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, any 
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conformation hearings over Judge Robert Bork’s Supreme Court 
nomination, Congress passed the Video Privacy Protection Act of 
1988.72  During the hearings, many were shocked to learn that a 
journalist from Washington, D.C.’s, City Paper had obtained a printout 
of the movies Judge Bork rented from his neighborhood video store.73  
Today, the Video Privacy Protection Act allows civil suits against any 
video tape service providers who knowingly disclose the titles of videos 
rented by their customers.74  The Act provides for statutory damages of 
$2500, plus punitive damages and reasonable attorney’s fees.75  We need 
not consult society’s expectation concerning whether video stores will 
disclose the movies that we rent.  Congress has already answered that 
question.  Moreover, by prohibiting disclosure, Congress has either 
created or reinforced a reasonable expectation of privacy in the video 
rental records. 
We cannot ignore, however, the role of social expectations in the 
legislative process.  As the branch most directly representative of the 
people, legislatures play a unique role in articulating public norms and 
values, including norms and values about privacy.76  Indeed, Congress 
 
type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the 
plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity under circumstances in 
which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy . . . . 
Id.; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.115 (West 2000) (prohibiting photographing a 
person without his or her consent “in a place where he or she would have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy”). 
 72. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000). 
 73. See SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION 72 (2000).  Though many 
remember the controversy over a journalist obtaining Judge Bork’s video rental records 
in the hope of demonstrating that he rented of pornographic films, fewer remember that 
the records revealed nothing controversial.  As it turned out, most of the 146 movies 
were Disney movies and Hitchcock films.  Id. 
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (2000).  Videotape service providers may, however, 
disclose the names of videos to law enforcement agencies pursuant to a warrant, grand 
jury subpoena, or court order.  Id. § 2710(b)(2)(C).  They may even disclose consumers’ 
names, addresses, and the “subject matter” of the videos they rent, so long as (1) they 
provide consumers the chance to opt-out of such disclosures, and (2) the subject 
matter information is used solely to market goods “directly to the consumer.”  Id. 
§ 2710(b)(2)(D)(ii). 
 75. Id. § 2710(c).  The Act also forbids the use of any improperly obtained video 
store information in any state or federal judicial, administrative, or legislative 
proceeding.  Id. § 2710(d). 
 76. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Bringing the Law to Life: A Plea for 
Disenchantment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 256, 256 (1989) (“Politics, I contend, is the only 
avenue by which public values (insofar as we can speak at all of such matters) might 
possibly be determinable and accessible.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican 
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1545 (1988) (The function of politics “is to select values, to 
implement ‘preferences about preferences,’ or to provide opportunities for preference 
formation rather than simply to implement existing desires.”) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 
1140 (1986); see also LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL 
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has on occasion taken a different view than the Supreme Court 
concerning what is a reasonable expectation of privacy in particular 
circumstances.  In the 1928 case Olmstead v. United States, the Court 
had to decide whether wiretapping a telephone line was a search under 
the Fourth Amendment.77  Despite Justice Brandeis’ famous defense of 
privacy in his dissent, the Court held that the wiretap was not a search, 
based on the suspect and literal-minded reasoning that the wiretap did 
not involve any physical intrusion into the house.78  In the wake of 
Olmstead, Congress blunted the effect of the Court’s ruling by enacting 
section 605 of the Federal Communication Act, prohibiting intercepting 
and revealing telephone communications without the sender’s consent.79 
Obviously, existing social norms are not the sole influence on legislation.  
Special interests wield tremendous influence on the legislative agenda, 
and often produce legislation that under protects privacy, compared with 
the level of protection contemporary social norms would support.80  In 
theory, Congress could blaze a trail that it felt was required as a matter 
of policy or morality, but that the prevailing norms of the time rejected.  
Were Congress to blaze such a trail in the privacy area, it would be 
 
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 186 (1994) (“[L]egislative bodies offer a 
more public, more participatory forum within which to debate and shape collective 
values.”). 
 77. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928). 
 78. Id. at 466.  In dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that the Court’s interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment should keep pace with developing technology.  Though physical 
intrusion into a suspect’s home was the way for government to invade privacy in the 
1790s, the development of telephone communications made invasions of privacy 
possible even without a physical intrusion.  See id. at 473–74.  Justice Brandeis argued 
that the Court should extend the Fourth Amendment to telephone communications in 
order to protect the same amount of privacy that the framers intended to protect.  See id. 
at 478–79.  Alan Westin noted that Chief Justice Taft was determined that the Olmstead 
case, involving a bootlegger defendant, would not see law enforcement hindered by 
“bleeding hearts,” and that Taft “saw the case as part of his struggle against the 
‘dangerous’ liberal positions advocated on constitutional issues by Justices Holmes, 
Brandeis, and Stone.”  WESTIN, supra note 1, at 340. 
 79. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2001); see Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and 
Seizure Constitutionalism: The New York Court of Appeals’ Quest for Principled 
Decisionmaking, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 59 (1996).  Note that Chief Justice Taft, in the 
majority opinion, invited Congress to pass legislation to address the wiretap issue.  See 
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465–66. 
 80. See generally Center for Public Integrity, Nothing Sacred: The Politics of 
Privacy (1998) (examining how special interest groups and corporations opposed to 
privacy legislation have influenced the legislative decisionmaking process on privacy 
protection), available at http://www.public-i.org/dtaweb/downloads/nothing_sacred.pdf 
(last visited July 21, 2002) [hereinafter Nothing Sacred]. 
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creating a reasonable expectation of privacy where none had existed 
before—or where one had once existed but had since disappeared. 
The unlikelihood of such trailblazing highlights the role of societal 
expectations in privacy legislation.  Given the powerful influence of 
various lobbies opposed to strong privacy protection,81 that role may best 
be described as a sine qua non.  That is, unless the public has a strong 
desire for privacy in a particular area, attempts to pass legislation 
establishing that area as a private sphere are doomed to fail.  The mere 
existence of public support, however, does not guarantee passage of the 
legislation.  To the extent that legislatures base privacy legislation on 
social values and norms, they necessarily rely on the same changing 
expectations as the judicial conception of privacy.  The following Section 
examines the mechanism by which powerful industries and institutions 
can gradually erode society’s expectation of privacy. 
C.  Encroachment on the Expectation-Driven Conception of Privacy 
This expectation-driven conception of privacy is vulnerable to 
encroachment.  Actors and groups powerful enough to influence social 
behavior can change society’s expectation of privacy, and thereby 
change what the law will protect as private.  They do so by changing 
their own conduct or practices, by changing or designing technology to 
affect privacy, or by implementing laws that affect society’s expectation 
of privacy. 
Jeffrey Rosen recognized the vulnerability of the expectation-driven 
conception of privacy.  “People’s subjective expectations of privacy tend 
to reflect the amount of privacy they subjectively experience; and as 
advances in the technology of monitoring and searching have made ever 
more intrusive surveillance possible, expectations of privacy have 
naturally diminished, with a corresponding reduction in constitutional 
protections.”82  So, for example, if employers monitor their employees’ 
telephone or e-mail use while they are in the workplace, they diminish 
the expectation of privacy in the workplace.  If merchants routinely sell 
consumers’ personal data, they diminish the expectation of privacy in 
one’s transactional information.  And if the Supreme Court holds that 
law enforcement may review citizens’ bank records without a warrant, it 
diminishes the societal expectation of privacy in one’s bank records.83 
 
 81. Id. (noting the influence of groups and corporations opposed to privacy 
through such means as campaign contributions and lucrative employment offers to senior 
congressional staffers). 
 82. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN 
AMERICA 60–61 (2000). 
 83. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that bank 
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The encroachment proceeds so gradually as to seem to be the 
inevitable price of progress.  An important precursor to resisting the 
process of encroachment is to recognize its cyclical and self-
perpetuating nature.  To examine where the process begins,84 I shall use 
an example in the context of workplace privacy.  In recent years, 
employers have become increasingly concerned about employee Internet 
use.  Employers express two concerns: first, that employees may visit 
and share Web sites that are sufficiently offensive to raise potential 
hostile work environment claims; and second, that employees may waste 
too much work time surfing the Web.85 
Suppose that when these concerns first emerged, employers had a 
variety of options at their disposal.  On one end of the spectrum were 
relatively noninvasive responses.  For example, they could focus on 
productivity statistics, which presumably would reflect Internet abuse as 
well as other inefficient habits.  Or they could ask supervisors to meet 
more frequently with their employees to keep tabs on both their 
productivity and their interactions with other employees.  On the other 
end of the spectrum were quite invasive responses.  For example, 
employers could install surveillance software on each employee’s 
computer to monitor every keystroke the user enters.86  Or they could 
 
depositors have no reasonable expectation that the bank will keep their records private 
from the government). 
 84. To say that the process begins is necessary for purposes of illustration, but is 
technically inaccurate because the process is ongoing.  Society’s expectations are 
constantly evolving in response to social changes. 
 85. See ROSEN, supra note 82, at 78–80 (discussing employer concern with sexual 
harassment liability resulting from employees’ inappropriate Internet and e-mail use); 
Charles Waltner, Tools that Monitor Employees’ Net Surfing Save Companies 
Bandwidth and Time, INFORMATIONWEEK, Apr. 27, 1998, at 121 (proposing that 
employers’ frustration with non work related Internet use spurred growth of Web 
monitoring tools), available at 1998 WL 2359450.  For example, in late 2001, the 
Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts activated filtering software that 
recorded all downloads of mpeg movie files and MP3 music files by federal judicial 
employees—including judges—accessing the Internet at work.  Jeffrey Rosen, Who’s 
Spying on Judges?, THE  NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, Sept. 10, 2001, at http://www.tnr.com/ 
091001/rosen091001.html.  The director justified the covert monitoring with slow 
Internet response times attributed to audio and video downloads.  Id. 
 86. See, e.g., Adavi, Inc., Product Overview: Silent Watch 2.0 (2000), at 
http://www.adavi.com/ overview.cfm (describing Silent Watch, a surveillance software 
package that monitors and records every keystroke on an unlimited number of 
computers) (last visited Apr. 29, 2002).  Adavi, Inc. describes Silent Watch as “ideal for 
businesses, schools, government entities and organizations with networked computers.”  
Id.  Silent Watch sells for $199.95.  Id.  Adavi, Inc. also offers a home version, Silent 
Guard, that monitors and logs keystrokes on a non-networked computer.  Silent Guard 
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install software that logs every Web page the employee visits and the 
duration of each visit.87  Still other responses lay somewhere in the 
middle ground, such as installing software to track the total time that 
each employee spends on the Web.88 
Further suppose that few employers had any established policy or 
practice to address their concerns, and that most employers adopted the 
middle-of-the-spectrum response of tracking the total time each employee 
spent online.  Before the employers took this step, many employees may 
have felt that the extent of their Internet use was not a matter that their 
employers should (or could) know.  Afterward, however, employees 
could no longer expect their employers to remain unaware of how often 
or for how long they used the Internet.  Although employers could 
expect some level of complaint from employees, they could probably 
rebut any minor opposition by justifying the measure as a moderate 
response to the efficiency and liability concerns discussed above.  By 
choosing the moderate response, employers slightly diminished society’s 
expectation of privacy in the workplace.  Further development of this 
hypothetical will help illustrate the two elements of the incremental 
encroachment on privacy—embedded imprecision and internalization—
which are discussed in the following Sections. 
1.  Embedded Imprecision 
Effective encroachment occurs at the margins, in the imprecision 
embedded in the expectation-driven conception of privacy.  This 
imprecision exists because there will always be a gray area between 
 
can even take a screen snapshot when any word in the product’s dictionary is typed or 
appears in any Internet traffic.  Id. Silent Guard sells for just $49.95.  Id. 
For another example, see Spectorsoft’s description of its product, “eBlaster.” 
SpectorSoft.com, eBlaster for Windows, at http://www.spectorsoft.com/products/eblaster 
_windows/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2002). 
Are you concerned about what your spouse, employees or children do on the 
Internet while you’re away?  You can’t always be around to watch over their 
shoulders, so hire a second pair of eyes with eBlaster. 
  eBlaster monitors their PC and Internet Activity by recording every 
[W]eb site they visit, every program they run, every keystroke they type, and 
all popular instant messages and chats.  eBlaster then sends the recorded 
activity to your e-mail address as frequently as every 30 minutes. 
Id.  The product even includes full transcripts of chat room and instant messaging 
sessions and is available for a special offer price of $69.95.  Id. 
 87. See Adavi, Inc., supra note 86 (advertising that Silent Watch can sound an 
alarm to the system administrator “when users reach objectionable Web sites or 
inappropriate text content based on a dictionary of the user’s choice.”). 
 88. See Waltner, supra note 85, at 121 (describing Web monitoring software that 
can automatically e-mail to managers a list of the most active Web surfers and calculate 
the cost of employees’ Web surfing by multiplying their online minutes by their per 
minute salary rate). 
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what society clearly expects to be protected (that is, private), and what it 
clearly understands to be unprotected.  Had the employers in my 
example chosen the most invasive option first, they risked mobilizing 
serious opposition among employees.  There would likely have been a 
consensus among employees that the most extreme option intruded on 
their privacy.  Choosing the most extreme option would have reached 
beyond the gray area and offended society’s expectation of privacy in 
the workplace.  Rather than overreach with a single step, actors encroach 
in small increments, repeatedly claiming the gray area for themselves.  
They exploit the imprecision that pervades our expectation-driven 
conception of privacy by eroding privacy at the margins. 
To further illustrate how embedded imprecision facilitates incremental 
encroachment, here are some possible next steps in my example.  
Employers could expand the monitoring of Internet usage to include the 
monitoring of which Web sites employees visit.  Given that employees 
already expect some monitoring of their Internet use, employers may not 
face serious opposition to this expansion of their current policy.  Some 
may voice complaints, but this small step probably would not offend any 
clearly understood expectation of privacy.  Once the Web site 
monitoring policy has taken root and employees have again reshaped 
their expectations, employers may expand their monitoring to include 
the individual Web pages visited within each site.  As that expansion and 
successive expansions are established, it may be only a matter of time 
before employers reach what at the outset had been the most extreme 
option—monitoring every keystroke on the company’s computers. 
2.  Internalization 
Critical to the incremental encroachment described above is that 
individuals internalize each successive encroachment.  For example, in 
the workplace monitoring hypothetical discussed above, employees first 
internalized the idea that employers would (and could) monitor the total 
time they spent on the Internet.  Once they accepted that practice, 
expectations shifted, so that the employers’ next step—monitoring the 
particular Web sites that employees visited—then lay within the gray 
area of unsettled expectations.  As each small step of encroachment 
becomes entrenched, individuals internalize the encroachment and lose 
any sense that privacy was once possible in the encroached-upon area.  
Because of this internalization, the expectation-driven privacy test 
cannot consider the effect of successive encroachments.  Rather, by its 
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nature, the test can only evaluate the challenged practice in light of the 
current level of expectations. 
Scholars have approached the phenomenon of internalization from 
many different perspectives and in connection with a variety of topics.  
Jeremy Bentham’s concept of the Panopticon most directly illustrates 
internalization in the privacy context.89  Bentham conceived his ideal 
prison, the Panopticon, in 1787.90  Its purpose was to change prisoners’ 
behavior through “the illusion of constant surveillance.”91  Bentham 
envisioned a central tower with windows on all sides, surrounded by a 
ring of cells occupied by the prisoners.  The cells open inward, and an 
inspector in the central tower can monitor and speak to any prisoner at 
any time.92  Critical to the panoptic effect is that the prisoners know their 
behavior can be constantly monitored, but cannot know when the 
inspector is monitoring them because they cannot see his face.93  The 
mere possibility of being observed deters misconduct, even when the 
prisoners are not being observed.94  The genius of Bentham’s Panopticon 
is that people gradually internalize and comply with the rules, without 
remembering that the inspector’s observation caused them to change 
their behavior.95  Foucault captures the internalization of privacy 
invasions: 
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes 
responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously 
upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he 
simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own 
subjection.96 
Thus, the panoptic condition becomes part of the inmates’ very identity.97 
 
 
 89. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 
195–308 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1977) (discussing Bentham’s Panopticon 
at length). 
 90. See REG WHITAKER, THE END OF PRIVACY: HOW TOTAL SURVEILLANCE IS 
BECOMING A REALITY 32 (1999). 
 91. Id. at 33 (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 16 (Miran 
Bozovic ed. 1995)).  Bentham trumpeted his idea as a “new mode of obtaining power of 
mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example.” Id. at 34 (quoting BENTHAM, 
supra, at 31).  Reg Whitaker termed the modern state of widespread surveillance the 
“Participatory Panopticon.”  Id. at 139. 
 92. Id. at 32–33. 
 93. Id. at 33.  An elaborate system of “lanterns and apertures” renders the 
Inspector a silhouette, so the prisoners cannot see his face.  Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Nicholas C. Burbules, Privacy, Surveillance, and Classroom Communication 
on the Internet, http://faculty.ed.uiuc.edu/burbules/ncb/papers/privacy.html (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2002). 
 96. FOUCAULT, supra note 89, at 202–03 (emphasis added). 
 97. See Burbules, supra note 95 (citing FOUCAULT, supra note 89, at 200).    
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In her extensive historical, sociological, and psychological study of 
information technology’s influence in the workplace, Shoshanna Zuboff 
observed internalization in workers trying to cope with their disappearing 
privacy.98  Workers whose conduct is exposed, especially in ways they 
might not choose to be, develop techniques to avoid the shame of 
disclosure.99  Zuboff called one such technique “anticipatory conformity.”100  
As surveillance becomes more pervasive, “the pressure of visibility 
begins to reorganize behavior at its source, shaping it in conformity with 
the normative standards of the observer.”101  Anticipatory conformity does 
not derive solely from the threat of shame before the employer, but also 
from the threat of shame before one’s coworkers.102 
The critical feature of the panoptic effect is that it becomes a way of 
life.  Nicholas Burbules, writing about the panoptic effect and the vulnerable 
state of privacy, observed that people gradually come to accept established 
mechanisms of surveillance, such as the video cameras that track us in 
subways, banks, parking lots, stores, and elevators.103  “As people accept 
the inevitability of being observed and recorded, their habits change; 
they change.”104  Not only do they change, but they lose sight of the 
external instrumentality that made them change in the first place.  
Burbles argues that the line between the public and private spheres may 
become meaningless as “people carry many of the attitudes and self-
imposed restrictions of activity from the surveyed public into their 
private life—so in what sense is it still ‘private’?”105 
Burbules illustrated the panoptic effect in a familiar context: seating 
students in a circle, rather than row-by-row.106  Because every student is 
continuously visible to the instructor and to the other students, every 
student must conform her behavior to what she considers acceptable to 
the others.107  The insidious aspect of the panoptic effect is not merely 
the conformity.  It is the fact that the students lose sight of why they have 
 
 98. See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF THE SMART MACHINE: THE 
FUTURE OF WORK AND POWER (1984). 
 99. Id. at 342–45. 
 100. Id. at 345. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 346. 
 103. Burbules, supra note 95. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  This illustrates how Zuboff’s anticipatory conformity works horizontally, 
within a peer group, as well as vertically, within a hierarchy. 
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conformed their behavior—to conform with the perceived norms of 
others.  The students gradually internalize those previously external 
norms, and superimpose them on their own.108  Because of this 
internalization, each step of the incremental encroachment is tested only 
against the status quo, without consideration of what society considered 
private several steps before.109 
3.  Overreaching 
Of course, not every attempted encroachment succeeds.  Occasionally, 
industry or government overreaches the gray area, and so upsets settled 
societal expectations that it must retreat.  Such steps were too drastic to 
remain hidden within the imprecision embedded in the expectation-
driven conception of privacy. 
One prominent example in cyberspace is DoubleClick’s failed plan to 
create a vast database of personal profiles by merging its detailed but 
anonymous Internet profiles with a vast store of personally identified 
direct mail profiles owned by Abacus Direct.  DoubleClick places ads 
from nearly 4500 companies on thousands of Web sites.110  When 
 
 108. See id.  Stanley Benn makes a similar point: “We act differently if we believe 
we are being observed.  If we can never be sure whether or not we are being watched and 
listened to, all our actions will be altered and our very character will change.” Stanley 
Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY, supra note 
1, at 1, 24 (quoting Hubert Humphrey, Forward to EDWARD V. LONG, THE INTRUDERS 
(1967)). 
 109. Internalization theories appear in a variety of literature not dealing directly 
with privacy.  Law and economics scholars have offered economic analyses to explain 
the internalization of social norms.  See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good 
Citizens?  An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1577–80 
(2000).  Elaborating on H.L.A. Hart’s jurisprudential discussion of rule internalization, 
Frederick Schauer explains that an agent has internalized a rule when the agent treats the 
rule’s existence as relevant to deciding what to do.  See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING 
BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN 
LAW AND LIFE 121 (1991).  Internalization also appears in behavioral and developmental 
psychology literature.  See, e.g., Joan E. Grusec & Jacqueline J. Goodnow, Impact of 
Parental Discipline Methods on the Child’s Internalization of Values: A 
Reconceptualization of Current Points of View, 30 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 4, 17 
(1994) (stating that internalization of a teacher’s values occurs when the student “feel[s] 
the message has not been imposed but rather has been self-generated”); Dale L. 
Cusumano & J. Kevin Thompson, Body Image and Body Shape Ideals in Magazines: 
Exposure, Awareness, and Internalization, 37 SEX ROLES 701–21 (1997) (reporting that 
in a study of female college students, researchers found that internalization of social 
body type norms had substantially higher predictive value of body dissatisfaction, eating 
disturbances, and low self-esteem than mere awareness of or exposure to social body 
type norms); Mark E. Young, A Classroom Application of Grusec and Goodnow’s 
Discipline Model of Internalization of Values, 115 EDUCATION 405, 405 (1995) 
(“Internalization of values is observed when acceptable behavior is generated from 
intrinsic factors and not from the anticipation of external consequences.”). 
 110. John Schwartz, Trade Commission Drops Inquiry of DoubleClick Inquiry, 
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consumers pull up one of those Web sites, DoubleClick places cookies 
on their hard drives, and uses the cookies to track consumers’ behavior 
as they surf the Web.111  DoubleClick combines the data it gathers about 
each consumer’s Web surfing habits into a profile, and delivers ads 
targeted to each consumer’s profile.112 
DoubleClick had always insisted that it collected consumer information 
anonymously.113  That changed in 1999, after DoubleClick’s $1.7 billion 
acquisition of Abacus Direct, which collects vast amounts of data on 
consumers’ catalog shopping habits.114  DoubleClick announced that it 
planned to merge its purportedly anonymous online information with 
Abacus Direct’s personally identified data.115  The public outcry proved 
too much for DoubleClick, whose public image and stock price suffered 
from inquiries by the Federal Trade Commission and several state 
attorneys general, and a complaint to the FTC by the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center.116  The pressure prompted DoubleClick to change 
its privacy policies, and to announce in May 2000 that it would not 
merge DoubleClick and Abacus Direct data.117 
 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2001, at C5. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Bob Tedeschi, E-Commerce Report: DoubleClick Is Seeking Ways to Use 
Online and Offline Data and Protect Users’ Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2001, at 
C9; DoubleClick Privacy Policy, available at http://www.doubleclick.com/us/corporate/ 
privacy/privacy/default.asp?asp_object_1=& (last modified Nov. 19, 2001). 
 113. Schwartz, supra note 110. 
 114. Id.; see Ted Kemp, Behind the DoubleClick Merger: Buying Behavior is 
Abacus’ Key Asset, DM NEWS, June 21, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 21954252 
(analyzing purchase by leading marketer of online advertisements of “a firm that 
manages the largest catalog of consumer catalog buying habits in the United States”). 
 115. Schwartz, supra note 110, at C5. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.  A California superior court judge recently found that DoubleClick’s Web 
profiling practices intruded upon society’s expectations of privacy.  The court refused to 
dismiss a class action claim for invasion of privacy under the California Constitution 
because “[r]easonable people could find that the secret accumulation of such private 
information by an entity with whom they have no [sic] agreed to deal with is a serious 
invasion of privacy.”  In re DoubleClick Cases, No. JC4120 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 6, 
2001), available at 2001 WL 1029646.  The court upheld a claim under a statute 
prohibiting eavesdropping on “confidential communications” because, although any 
reasonably intelligent Internet user would be aware that e-mail and chat room messages 
are recorded, the “defendant has not shown that the same can be said of Web browsing 
activities.”  Id. (applying section 632(c) of the California Penal Code, CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 632(c) (Deering 1998), and defining “confidential communication” as “communication 
carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the 
communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto”).  Carried to its logical 
conclusion, the court’s reasoning would require dismissal of the  plaintiffs’ claims if data 
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The government is not immune to such overreaching, as shown by the 
Johnson administration’s failed effort to create a National Data Center.  
In 1965, the Bureau of the Budget proposed that the federal government 
create a National Data Center to centralize data processing and storage 
efforts by all federal agencies.  The first step would be to store selected 
data from the Bureaus of the Census and Labor Statistics, the Internal 
Revenue Service, and the Social Security Administration.  The original 
purpose was to cut costs, but proponents touted the potential benefits of 
cross-referencing data among all federal agencies, such as promoting 
efficient use of the data and improving data security.  The concept 
“slowly evolved into that of a massive databank containing cradle-to-
grave electronic records for every U.S. citizen.”118  The database would 
contain birth certificates, proof of citizenship, school records, draft and 
military service information, tax records, Social Security records, death 
records, and estate information.119 
Once publicized, the plan was criticized in the press, and Congress 
held hearings on the threat of computer databases.120  The House Special 
Subcommittee on Invasion of Privacy and the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Administrative Practices both heard testimony highly 
critical of the National Data Center plan.121  Given the extreme negative 
response in the public and in Congress, the administration did not 
proceed with the plan.122 
In a second example of government overreaching, the original draft of 
the Cyberspace Electronic Security Act could have been interpreted to 
allow law enforcement to remotely access and place “back doors” in 
suspects’ computers.123  A back door could give the government access 
to the suspect’s every keystroke, allowing the government to learn 
passwords and decrypt otherwise uncrackable cryptography.  Some even 
thought the draft Act might grant government permission to contract 
with software makers to embed those back doors in their systems, so that 
law enforcement could activate the back doors remotely.  The clause in 
question “was quickly dropped in the face of furious opposition from 
civil liberties groups.”124 
 
profiling on the Web becomes well-known and commonplace. 
 118. GARFINKEL, supra note 73, at 13–14. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 14. 
 121. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY 
FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 311 (2000); GARFINKEL, supra note 73, at 14. 
 122. GARFINKEL, supra note 73, at 14. 
 123. Froomkin, Death of Privacy?, supra note 1, at 1487–88 (citing the Draft 
Cyberspace Electronic Security Act Bill).  A back door is a deliberate hole in system 
security.  See id. 
 124. Id. 
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We must not be misled by these highly publicized incidents of 
overreaching.  Although these examples demonstrate the potential to 
resist encroachment, they are rare exceptions.  Most incremental steps of 
encroachment receive little, if any, public attention.  The encroachment 
occurs below society’s radar, so to speak. 
In theory, the expectation-driven conception of privacy means that 
behavioral or technological changes in a society can not only diminish, 
but can also expand the scope of privacy.125  For example, employers 
could pledge not to review medical information about prospective 
employees.  The media could refrain from printing information about 
political candidates’ personal lives.  And Congress could pass legislation 
preventing merchants from using personal data about consumers without the 
consumers’ specific, informed consent to each use.  Each of these steps 
would tend to expand the societal expectation of privacy in the affected 
information.126 
In reality, however, we rarely see such expansions of privacy, because 
the expectation-driven conception of privacy magnifies the effects of 
incremental encroachment, and because individuals trying to resist that 
encroachment face seemingly insurmountable obstacles.  The next two 
Sections discuss how these incentives and obstacles facilitate the 
incremental erosion of privacy. 
III.  THE EXPECTATION-DRIVEN CONCEPTION OF PRIVACY 
AND THE FACILITATION OF INCREMENTAL                                   
ENCROACHMENT 
The previous Part examined in broad terms how the expectation-
driven conception of privacy is vulnerable to incremental encroachment.  
This Part examines how, at the level of particular transactions or 
practices, the expectation-driven conception of privacy magnifies the 
 
 125. See id. at 1523 (“Anything that increases a citizen’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy will, under current doctrine, also increase the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protections.”). 
 126. See id. at 1507–08. 
Prohibiting the use of technologies that are not already commonplace prevents 
the public from being desensitized, and it ensures a reasonable expectation of 
being able to walk in public without being scanned by them.  Similarly, 
prohibiting the use of commonplace technologies also creates a (legally) 
reasonable expectation that others will follow the law, and that restricted 
technologies will not be used. 
Id.   
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ultimate effect of encroachment.  As each step of encroachment becomes 
magnified, individuals find it all the more difficult to resist encroachment on 
their privacy. 
A.  Intentional Exploitation of the Expectation-Driven                        
Conception of Privacy 
The expectation-driven conception of privacy creates a perverse 
incentive for businesses to diminish, proactively, individuals’ expectations 
of privacy.127  The logic is simple—one cannot be held liable for 
invading an expectation of privacy where none exists.  We find an 
obvious example of this manipulation in the employment context, where 
lawyers routinely advise their clients to deny employees any expectation 
of privacy.  According to Shanti Atkins of Employment Law Learning 
Technologies, which helps create corporate privacy policies, “Lowering 
expectation [sic] of privacy is the No. 1 thing they can do to protect 
themselves from privacy litigation.”128  One commentator advises that 
“[a]n employer should develop a policy that effectively lowers the 
expectation of privacy in advance . . . .  This will greatly improve an 
employer’s chances of tipping the privacy balance in its favor in future 
litigation challenging the surveillance or monitoring.”129  Another 
advises employers to issue written e-mail usage policies that put 
employees “on notice that the employer will monitor the use of its 
computer equipment and electronic services.  This destroys any reasonable 
expectation of privacy an employee may have regarding e-mail or 
Internet usage.”130  He further advises requiring employees to sign forms 
consenting to the policy.  “Although a signed consent form may not 
provide additional protection if not uniformly enforced, it still 
demonstrates employee awareness and may help to defeat a right to 
privacy claim.”131 
We have seen similar preemptive strikes in the area of medical 
privacy.  Medical consumers have customarily been asked to sign broad 
releases that could justify almost any disclosure of medical data.132  As a 
 
 127. See ROSEN, supra note 82, at 70. 
 128. Jeffrey Benner, Privacy at Work? Be Serious, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 1, 2001, at 
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,42029,00.html (last visited June 23, 2002). 
 129. Kevin J. Baum, E-Mail in the Workplace and the Right of Privacy, 42 VILL. L. 
REV. 1011, 1039 n.142 (1997). 
 130. Hall Adams, III, et al., E-Mail Monitoring in the Workplace: The Good, the 
Bad and the Ugly, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 32, 44 (2000). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care 
Information, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 49 (1997).  Schwartz calls this practice a “shallow 
consent process.”  Id. 
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result, medical consumers give consent without any meaningful 
information about what they are consenting to.  The sweeping release 
insulates the health care provider against any claimed expectation that 
the provider would not share the data.133  The medical privacy 
regulations promulgated at the end of the Clinton administration have 
taken a first step towards addressing this problem.  Though they include 
a host of exceptions,134 the regulations impose several requirements on 
providers attempting to gain patients’ authorization to use or disclose 
health information for purposes other than treatment, billing and operations.  
Authorization forms must include, in plain language, a description “in a 
specific and meaningful fashion” of the information to be disclosed; the 
specific identification of the person or class of persons who may make 
the disclosure and who may receive the disclosure; and a date or event 
upon which the consent expires.135 
Web sites commonly attempt to diminish consumers’ expectations of 
privacy through their so-called privacy policies.  It is de rigueur for a 
privacy policy to make very specific representations, only to nullify 
them with a broad disclaimer professing the right to change the policy 
without notice.  Prior to August 31, 2000, Amazon.com’s Privacy Notice 
stated that “Amazon.com does not sell, trade, or rent your personal 
information to others.”136  The policy continued, however: “We may 
choose to do so in the future with trustworthy third parties, but you can tell 
us not to by sending a blank e-mail message to never@amazon.com.”137  
Amazon changed its policy on August 31, 2000, explaining that it was 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Exceptions include disclosures in connection with the following: public health 
activities; abuse, neglect, or domestic violence victims; health oversight activities; 
judicial and administrative proceedings; law enforcement purposes; organ or tissue 
donation; research; veterans activities; national security and intelligence activities; 
protective services for the President and other officials; and workers’ compensation 
claims.  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)-(l) (2001).  Nor do the detailed consent requirements 
apply to disclosures to be used for marketing purposes,  see id.  § 164.514(e), although 
the Department of Health and Human Services has proposed modifications that would 
apply those consent requirements to most marketing disclosures.  See Standards for 
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 14776, 14815 
(proposed Mar. 27, 2002) (proposing new section 164.508(a)(3)). 
 135. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c). 
 136. Letter from Mariam J. Naini, Associate General Counsel, Amazon.com, Inc. & 
David Gabrieli, Government Affairs Counsel, Amazon.com, Inc., to Donald S. Clark, 
Secretary, Federal Trade Commission (June 11, 1999), (attaching Amazon.com’s 
Privacy Policy and customer “Bill of Rights”), available at http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/ 
comments/amazoncom.htm (last visited May 17, 2002) . 
 137. Id. 
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simply clarifying the old policy by specifying that it might share personal 
information, without customers’ consent, in limited circumstances, 
including the sale of Amazon.com to another company.138  Of course, 
the new policy contains another broad exception, which renders’ 
Amazon’s restrictive language meaningless: “Our business changes 
constantly.  This Notice and the Conditions of Use will change also, and 
use of information that we gather now is subject to the Privacy Notice in 
effect at the time of use.”139  So, at least according to the terms of the so-
called Privacy Notice, Amazon.com customers have no expectation that 
Amazon.com will maintain their privacy. 
The hard lesson learned by Toysmart.com should ensure that Web 
sites include such no privacy clauses in their privacy policies.  
Toysmart.com filed for bankruptcy and announced that it would sell its 
database of customer information.140  Its privacy policy, however, 
promised unequivocally that customers’ personal information “is never 
shared with a third party,” and did not contain any catch-all reservation 
of the right to change the policy.141  The FTC sued Toysmart.com for 
misrepresenting to consumers that it would never share personal 
information with third parties.142  The FTC settled that lawsuit in 
exchange for Toysmart.com’s agreement to sell the customer data only 
to a business that operated a similar Web site and agreed to honor all 
terms of Toysmart.com’s Privacy Statement.143  The FTC’s decision 
drew protest from privacy advocates and many state attorneys general, 
who filed objections to the sale.144  Eventually, the bankruptcy judge 
ordered the customer data destroyed as part of a settlement in which the 
Walt Disney subsidiary that owned the majority stake in Toysmart.com 
 
 138. Amazon.com, Privacy Notice, available at http://www.amazon.com/exec/ 
obidos/tg/browse/-/468496/107-6519540-0867760 (visited Apr. 20, 2002); Tamara 
Loomis, Amazon Revamps Its Policy on Sharing Data, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 21, 2000, at 5.  
Notice that the new policy language also eliminated customers’ ability to request that 
Amazon.com not share their data.  Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See Stephanie Stoughton, FTC: Toysmart.com Violated Kids’ Privacy; 
Agency’s Settlement on Data Rapped, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 2000, at C1, available at 
2000 WL 3335599. 
 141. Toysmart.com, Privacy Statement, available at http://www.toysmart.com/toys 
mart/ts_cs_privacy/policy.asp (last visited Apr. 26, 2001). 
 142. First Amended Complaint, Federal Trade Commission v. Toysmart.com, LLC, 
Civ. No. 00-11341-RGS (D. Mass. July 21, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/20 
00/07/toysmartcomplaint.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2002). 
 143. See Stipulation and Order Establishing Conditions on Sale of Customer 
Information, In re Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-13995-CJK (Bankr. D. Mass. July 20, 
2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/toysmarttbankruptcy.1.htm (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2002). 
 144. See Stephanie Stoughton, States Weigh in on Toysmart Privacy Case; 38 
Attorneys General Join Opposition to Sale of Data, BOSTON GLOBE, July 26, 2000, at 
C1, available at 2000 WL 3336111. 
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paid the bankrupt company $50,000.145  The lesson of the Toysmart.com 
saga may turn out to be that Web companies rely increasingly on no 
privacy policies like Amazon.com’s. 
B.  Media Encroachment and Society’s Diminution of Its                        
Own Privacy Expectations 
Today the media relentlessly appeal to and cultivate a voyeurism 
through which society unwittingly erodes its own expectation of privacy.  
The feeding frenzy yields television shows like Big Brother and Survivor, 
tabloid journalism in which no subject is too personal, and relentless 
investigation into the personal lives of public figures and their families.  
As we watch and read, we willingly delve into what we see as other 
people’s privacy.  However, because of the expectation-driven nature of 
privacy, we are simultaneously diminishing our own expectations of 
privacy. 
Over a century ago, the problem of tabloid journalism prompted 
Warren and Brandeis to write their seminal article on privacy.146  Today, 
we deal with problems similar in kind but far greater in degree.  Extreme 
elements of the media seize upon and sell increasingly intimate details of 
people’s personal lives, gradually dragging the mainstream media along 
for the ride once the prevailing expectations of privacy have sufficiently 
diminished that the public will accept more banal fare.  For example, 
sensationalist journalism was not so long ago confined to supermarket 
tabloids.  Now, such stories are reprinted in other newspapers, broadcast 
on television shows like Inside Edition and Access Hollywood, and 
spread across the Internet.147  David Broder wrote that the print and 
broadcast versions of tabloid journalism “have demonstrated the capacity to 
‘launch’ stories—often of the sleaziest kind—that the mainstream press 
feels necessary to follow.”148  Warren and Brandeis warned back in 1890 
that tabloid journalism would erode social standards in gradual increments: 
 
 
 145. See Stephanie Stoughton, Toysmart.com List to Be Destroyed, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Jan. 30, 2001, at D7. 
 146. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 32, at 76–77. 
 147. CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 188 (1999). 
 148. See Andrea Sachs, Mud and the Mainstream: When the Respectable Press 
Chases the National Enquirer, What’s Going On?, 34 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., 
May/June 1995, at 33, 33 (quoting David S. Broder, Junk Journalism, WASH. POST, Feb. 
23, 1994, at A17). 
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Nor is the harm wrought by such invasions confined to the suffering of those 
who may be made the subjects of journalistic or other enterprise.  In this, as in 
other branches of commerce, the supply creates the demand.  Each crop of 
unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed of more, and, in direct 
proportion to its circulation, results in a lowering of social standards and of 
morality.  Each gossip apparently harmless, when widely and persistently 
circulated, is potent for evil.149 
Recent decades have seen encroachment incentives at work in the 
media’s coverage of public officials’ personal lives.  The press has a 
strong incentive to disclose potentially embarrassing private facts about 
public officials.  For the shrinking number of corporations that own the 
media, the profit motive is obvious: sensational or salacious stories 
generate higher ratings and readership, which in turn generate more 
revenue.150  Individual journalists have their own incentives, which 
include money, power, and celebrity.151  They attempt to legitimize the 
intrusion on public officials’ sex lives on the theory that a history of 
sexual indiscretions demonstrates bad character or judgment, both 
undesirable traits in political leaders.152  The media use the mantra of the 
public’s right to know as justification for serving or stimulating the 
public’s voyeuristic desire to know. 
In the past, public officials could expect a measure of privacy for their 
sexual affairs.  Anita Allen wrote of a time when “family, friends, 
employees, and the press adhered to an unwritten code of privacy,” and 
kept secret the “sexual intimacies of public officials and celebrities.”153  
Allen cited as examples the rumored affairs of both President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt and First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, and the extramarital sex 
lives of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson.154  Today, 
however, public servants have internalized the media’s encroachment on 
privacy.  Public servants now believe that “what takes place in private, 
unless dull and routine, is likely to become public knowledge 
anyway.”155  Allen pointed out the change in how the media treated 
political figures’ sexual conduct, from the Kennedy to the Clinton 
 
 149. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 32, at 77. 
 150. See, e.g., David Shaw, Two Impulses Drive the Mania: Prurience and Self-
Preservation, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1998, at B11; David Shaw, The Simpson Legacy: 
Chapter Three: Tabloid Tornado; Mainstream Media; ‘The Godzilla of Tabloid Stories’, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1995, at S4; David Shaw, Obsessed with Flash and Trash, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1994, at A1. 
 151. Anita Allen, Privacy and the Public Official: Talking About Sex as a Dilemma 
for Democracy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1999). 
 152. Id. at 1168.  The National Enquirer established a measure of credibility among 
mainstream publications when it helped end Gary Hart’s political career by publishing 
the infamous “Monkey Business” photo.  Sachs, supra note 148, at 33. 
 153. Allen, supra note 151, at 1174. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1165. 
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administrations.156  Public officials’ diminished expectations over those 
three decades are especially problematic because of the media’s ability 
to resurrect indiscretions that political figures had considered ancient 
history.  In 1998, when the House of Representatives impeached 
President Clinton for his conduct in the Lewinsky scandal, three 
different news outlets broke stories about decades-old extramarital 
affairs involving House Republicans.  Salon.com exposed the thirty-year-
old extramarital affair of Republican Congressman Henry Hyde, a House 
prosecutor in the Clinton impeachment trial.157  Republican Congressman 
Dan Burton preempted impending press reports by admitting to the 
Indianapolis Star and News that he had fathered a child in an extramarital 
affair during the 1980s.158  And the Internet site of Congressional 
newsletter Roll Call first published House Speaker-Elect Bob Livingston’s 
admission, also to preempt forthcoming media reports that he had engaged 
in several extramarital affairs during his thirty-three years of marriage.159  
This unrelenting media coverage about public officials’ personal lives 
feeds—or generates160—the public’s desire for such salacious details.  
And as the increasingly intimate media coverage makes society come to 
expect such coverage, public officials gradually lose the  expectation of 
privacy in their intimate relations. 
Allen also addressed the more general erosion, over the last decades of 
the twentieth century, of the “expectations of personal privacy and of the 
 
 156. Id. at 1168–69. 
 157. David Talbot, This Hypocrite Broke up My Family, SALON.COM, Sept. 18, 
1998 at http://www.salon.com/news/1998/09/cov_16newsb.html (last visited Mar. 29, 
2001). 
 158. George Stuteville et al., Burton Admits Affair, INDIANAPOLIS STAR AND NEWS, 
Sept. 5, 1998, at 1; see Edward Walsh, Burton Fathered Child in Extramarital Affair, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1998, at A1. 
 159. Howard Kurtz, White House Angry About GOP Charge, WASH. POST, Dec. 
18, 1998, at A40; Text of Livingston Statement, Thursday, Dec. 17, 1998, 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/ 
stories/livingstontext121798.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2001).  This slew of exposed 
affairs may be attributable in part to Hustler Magazine publisher Larry Flynt, who in 
October 1998 offered up to $1 million for information about the sexual affairs of 
political leaders.  Flynt accused Republicans pursuing the Clinton-Lewinsky affair of 
hypocrisy.  See Livingston Bows Out of the Speakership, CNN.COM, Dec. 19, 1998, at 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1998/12/19/livingston.quits/ (last visited Mar. 
29, 2001). 
 160. For a critique of the notion that the media simply “give the people what they 
want,” see ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION 
POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES 32–33 (1999) (“As much as demand creates supply, supply 
creates demand.”). 
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taste for personal privacy in the United States.”161  She speculated that 
possible causes include the prevalence of communication and 
surveillance-enhancing technologies, government surveillance practices, 
and commercial data collection techniques.162  Further diminishing 
expectations of privacy are “opportunities to earn money and celebrity by 
giving up privacy voluntarily, and . . . opportunities to consume other 
people’s privacy and private lives on the cheap.”163  We find often 
shocking exposés of personal lives in tabloids, television talk shows like 
Oprah and Jerry Springer, and so-called reality TV shows like CBS’s 
Big Brother and Survivor, and MTV’s The Real World.  These tell-all 
stories and programs depend upon more than the exhibitionist few who 
participate; they depend upon a great silent majority of the public with a 
voyeuristic taste for peering into other people’s privacy. 
Allen noted perceptively that these genres of voyeurism quickly lose 
their shock value, and must continually be replaced by even more 
shocking manifestations, like using Internet Web sites that allow you to 
find detailed personal or financial information about others,164 or 
“watch[ing] strangers on-line in real time as they groom themselves and 
interact with their intimates.”165  The market for private facts both feeds 
and constructs the taste for consuming other people’s privacy.166 
Allen harbored some hope that in the aftermath of the Clinton-
Lewinsky ordeal our public officials’ expectations of sexual privacy may 
wax in response to several decades of waning.  There is a chance, she 
 
 161. Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 729 (1999). 
 162. Id. at 730. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See, e.g., Harris Digital Publishing Group, NetDetective 7.0, at http://www.net 
detective2001.com (last visited July 15, 2002).  The Net Detective’s promotion speaks 
volumes about its intended audience: 
With Net Detective’s exclusive BACKGROUND CHECKER™ YOU CAN [ ] 
Check Out new and old ROMANTIC interests; Dig up the dirt on your BOSS, 
co-workers, or neighbors; Verify EMPLOYMENT applications; check for 
bankruptcy, small claims, and TAX LIENS; Check death, MARRIAGE and 
PROPERTY records; Snoop for SECRETS your neighbors don’t want you to 
know. 
Harris Digital Publishing Group, supra, at http://www.netdetective2001.com/background 
_searches.html (last visited July 15, 2002).  The site proudly displays the following 
testimonial: 
I have been telling my friends about NetDetective.  I have also been snooping 
on my friends, and they don’t even know it.  I found out how much alimony 
and child support my next door neighbor gets, and that my neighbor across the 
street has some big credit problems.  This is AWESOME!!! 
Harris Digital Publishing Group, supra, at http://www.netdetective2001.com/court_records.html 
(last visited July 15, 2002).  Net Detective 2001 sells for $29.00.  Harris Digital Publishing 
Group, supra, at http://www.netdetective2001.com (last visited July 15, 2002). 
 165. Allen, supra note 161, at 731. 
 166. Id. at 735. 
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wrote, that the country “will begin a process of voluntary self-correction, 
shifting the balance toward greater respect for the privacy of public 
officials and aspiring officials.”167  This ray of hope implicitly 
recognizes that a diminution in society’s self-perceived entitlement to 
the details of public officials’ sex lives would yield a corresponding 
increase in the officials’ expectation of privacy. 
Such a renewed emphasis on privacy, however, may prove most 
difficult of all as it pertains to the media.  Media encroachment is 
effectively sanctioned by the unique protection of the First Amendment.  
For example, the actual malice rule for defamation actions established 
by New York Times v. Sullivan168 also applies to actions for false light 
invasion of privacy.169  When the media reports on a matter of public 
concern, a plaintiff in a false light claim must prove not only that the 
publicity would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, but also that 
the publication contained a “knowing or reckless falsehood.”170  Similarly, 
the First Amendment prevents suits against the media for publication of 
private facts, so long as the facts were true and of public significance, 
and the press did not violate the law to obtain them.171  In Florida Star v. 
B.J.F., the plaintiff sued a newspaper for identifying her as a victim of a 
sexual assault.172  Florida law prohibited police departments from allowing 
publication of sexual offense victims’ names and prohibited the newspaper 
from publishing the names.173  The police, however, mistakenly included 
the plaintiff’s name in a copy of a police report sent to the pressroom, 
and the newspaper published her name.174  The Court found for the 
newspaper because the report was true, the newspaper itself did not 
obtain the name illegally, and the statute prohibiting publication was not 
necessary to serve a compelling state interest.175 
 
 167. Allen, supra note 151, at 1181. 
 168. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 169. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967). 
 170. Id. at 390; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). 
 171. See generally  Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. 
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that where a newspaper obtained rape victim’s 
identity from publicly available judicial records, First Amendment barred invasion of 
privacy claim for publication of rape victims’ identity). 
 172. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 527–28. 
 173. Id. at 526. The newspaper’s own internal policy also prohibited printing the 
names of rape victims.  Id. at 528. 
 174. Id. at 527. 
 175. Id. at 537–40.  Many commentators feel that the tort for public disclosure of 
private facts has been rendered a dead letter.  See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and 
the First Amendment Right To Gather News, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1999) 
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The Court recently extended this rule even further.  In Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, the Court held that the First Amendment prohibited a suit 
against a radio station that aired an illegally recorded tape of a cell 
phone conversation.176  The Court held that the radio station merited 
First Amendment protection because, although it knew the tape had been 
illegally recorded, the station itself did not participated in or solicit the 
illegal recording.177 
Some commentators suggest that the actual malice rule is unnecessary 
for defamation actions, and that revoking the rule’s protection would not 
change the media’s editorial decisions or reporter’s conduct.178  If 
special First Amendment protections are similarly unnecessary in 
invasion of privacy claims, then they serve only to subsidize the media’s 
encroachment on privacy. 
C.  Unintended Consequences 
In The Economy of Ideas, cyberspace visionary John Perry Barlow 
invoked the aphorism that “information wants to be free.”179  For 
Barlow, this positive affirmation recognized “the natural desire of 
secrets to be told.”180  His implication was that, as the Internet replaced 
the old world order of static media, copyright could have no hold on the 
“liquid works of the future,” comprised purely of ideas that constantly 
 
(stating that the tort “often seems to exist more ‘in the books’ than in practice”); Diane 
L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s 
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 351 (1983) (“The process of defining 
‘newsworthy’ information has practically destroyed the private-facts tort as a realistic 
source of a legal remedy.”). 
 176. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001). 
 177. Id. at 525. 
 178. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 
1321, 1328–34 (1992).  Schauer questioned the empirical assumption on which the 
actual malice rule is based—without the heightened protection of the actual malice rule, 
the financial risk of defamation lawsuits will impair the media’s editorial judgment.  He 
also noted the distributional inequity of heaping upon a select few plaintiffs the cost of a 
social good like free expression, and explored ways to reallocate the costs of free speech.  
Id. at 1336–48. 
 179. John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 1994, at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas_pr.html (last visited March 29, 
2001).  Stuart Brand is credited with originating this maxim at the first Hackers’ 
Conference in 1984, where he said:  
On the one hand information wants to be expensive, because it’s so valuable. 
The right information in the right place just changes your life. On the other 
hand, information wants to be free, because the cost of getting it out is getting 
lower and lower all the time. So you have these two fighting against each 
other.   
Id.  Roger Clarke, Information Wants to Be Free, at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/ 
Roger.Clarke/II/IWtbF.html (last modified Feb. 24, 2000). 
 180. Barlow, supra note 179. 
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“evolve to fill the empty niches of their local environments” and struggle 
to “be free.”181  Privacy advocates, however, may come to lament an 
important corollary to Barlow’s axiom.  Because of information’s tendency 
toward expansion, its desire to be free, information collected by one 
person for one purpose will inevitably be used by others and for other 
purposes. 
We can express information’s desire to be free in economic terms.  
Information is nonrivalrous, so an actor that collects information can 
share that information with unlimited others and still use it for its 
original purpose.182  Information is inexpensive to transmit, so an actor 
with large stores of data can share that data internally or externally at 
very low cost.183  And information is nonexcludable, so an actor that 
maintains a database must expend substantial resources to prevent 
unauthorized parties from learning about the information.184  
Nonexcludability applies not only to outsiders, but also to insiders who 
are not authorized to access the information.185 
The foregoing properties of information set the stage for unintended 
consequences that increase the ultimate effect of any particular 
encroachment.  Information collected by one actor will inevitably find 
its way into someone else’s hands, either through willful transfer of the 
information to a new use or a third party, or through accidental 
disclosure to a third party or unauthorized insider.  We may think of 
these unintended consequences of data collection as externalities, 
which economists define as costs or benefits from an exchange that do 
not fall upon or accrue to the parties to that exchange.186  The initial 
encroacher pays (in such currencies as money, political capital, or 
goodwill) only for the immediate cost of the encroachment, but does 
not bear the cost of subsequent unintended consequences.  Because 
these unintended consequences are generally speculative at the time of 
the initial encroachment, individuals find it difficult to use the 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 126 (3d. ed. 
2000). 
 183. See id. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See George J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 
J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 632 (1980) (“Regulation of the information flows within an 
enterprise is difficult because of the very intangibility of many forms of information 
flows.”). 
 186. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 182, at 40; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, 
MICROECONOMICS 592–93 (5th ed. 2001). 
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unintended consequences to argue against the encroachment. 
1.  Secondary Use 
Secondary use occurs when an actor collects data or institutes a 
surveillance technique for one purpose, and the data or the surveillance 
technique are used by other actors or for other purposes.  A classic 
example of secondary use is the proliferation of the Social Security 
number (SSN).  Congress originally created the SSN in 1935 with 
assurances that it would be used solely to identify citizens’ retirement 
accounts.187  In 1943, the Roosevelt administration reasoned that it 
would be wasteful for other government agencies to develop their own 
identifying systems, and ordered agencies developing such systems to 
use the SSN.188  By 1967 the Department of Defense, Internal Revenue 
Service, and Civil Service Commission all adopted the SSN to track 
people in their systems.189  Starting in the 1970s, government use of the 
SSN exploded.  By 1998 the Secretary of Health and Human services 
recognized that the SSN was “in such extraordinarily wide use as to be a 
de facto national identifier.”190 
Not only did the state and federal governments adopt the SSN, but private 
actors embraced the number as well.  A vast array of businesses use the 
SSN, including information brokers, credit bureaus, collection agencies, 
banks, credit card companies, utilities, landlords, health care providers, and 
insurers.191  As one commentator observed, “SSN use is so important to 
business and government in this country that a person who is assertive about 
their [sic] privacy rights may find herself in a position in which another will 
 
 187. H.R. REP. NO. 106-996(I) (2000), available at 2000 WL 1604000. 
The SSN was created in 1935 for the sole purpose of tracking workers’ 
earnings so that Social Security benefits could be calculated upon retirement or 
disability. . . .  Because a unique SSN is assigned to each individual, the 
number is commonly used as a personal identifier, although it was never 
intended for this purpose. 
Id.; accord Charlotte Twight, A Constitutional Counterrevolution, IDEAS ON LIBERTY, 
Oct. 2000, at 15, 20. 
 188. GARFINKEL, supra note 73, at 20. 
 189. Id. at 33. 
 190. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNIQUE HEALTH IDENTIFIER FOR 
INDIVIDUALS: A WHITE PAPER § III.A.1, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ 
medical/hhs-id-798.html (July 2, 1998); see also Charlotte Twight, Watching You, 4 
INDEP. REV. 165, 169 (1999). 
 191. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/HEHS-99-28, 
REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY, COMMITTEE ON WAYS 
AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: GOVERNMENT AND COMMERCIAL USE OF THE 
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS WIDESPREAD 3, 7–10 (1999), available by searching GAO 
reports at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces160.shtml?/gao/index.html (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2001). 
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refuse to do business with her unless she furnishes her SSN.”192 
Driver’s license databases further illustrate the secondary use problem.  
Although states undoubtedly have an interest in regulating their drivers, 
the mere act of creating a database of drivers’ personal information 
inevitably spurs additional uses of that information.  For example, the 
state of Missouri sells its automobile and driver’s license information to 
about 400 companies, mostly for marketing purposes.193  The companies 
include: eye doctors seeking a list of drivers with vision restrictions on 
their licenses; big and tall men’s clothing stores seeking drivers over a 
certain height; medical insurers seeking drivers who are turning sixty-
five and might be interested in supplemental Medicare insurance; and 
automobile insurers seeking drivers whose licenses are being reinstated 
after a suspension.194  One driver who applied for license reinstatement 
reportedly received sixteen mail offers from “high-risk” automobile 
insurers.195  Missouri reportedly earned $500,000 per year selling its 
drivers’ license information.196  Until a new state law took effect in 
2000, Ohio earned about $3 million per year selling its driver’s license 
data to marketing companies.197  As of 2000, the Wisconsin Department 
of Transportation received approximately $8 million each year from the 
sale of motor vehicle information.198 
Congress passed the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”) in 
1994 to curb the disclosure of personal information from state driver’s 
records.199  Although the DPPA prohibited states from releasing drivers’ 
personal information for marketing purposes without their consent, the 
DPPA lacked real teeth until 1999, when Congress changed the act’s 
protection scheme from “opt-out” to “opt-in.”200  Under the opt-out 
scheme, a state could assume it had drivers’ permission to share their 
 
 192. Flavio L. Komuves, We’ve Got Your Number: An Overview of Legislation and 
Decisions to Control the Use of Social Security Numbers as Personal Identifiers, 16 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 529, 535 (1998). 
 193. Rick Desloge, State Makes $500,000 a Year Selling Personal Information, ST. 
LOUIS BUS. J., Oct. 16, 1998, available at http://stlouis.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/ 
1998/10/19/newscolumn1.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2001). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Ohio Limits Sale of Driver Data; Marketers Can No 
Longer Buy Lists of Names, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 6, 2000, at C10. 
 198. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 144 (2000). 
 199. See id. at 143–44. 
 200. See Driver’s Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 106-69, 113 Stat. 986, 
§§ 350(c)–(d) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(11)–(12) (2000)). 
FINALSPENCER.DOC 2/11/2020  2:49 PM 
 
882 
information, unless the drivers negated that permission by opting out.201  
In contrast, the opt-in scheme requires a state to assume that it does not 
have drivers’ permission to share their information unless the drivers 
provide express consent.202  In the month after Ohio implemented its 
opt-in law, only a handful of drivers opted in.203 
Some states use the existing infrastructure surrounding the driver’s 
license to collect new types of information.  As of May 2000, five states 
required a fingerprint when a person obtained a driver’s license.204  
Missouri officials recently considered printing personal information, 
including medical and financial information, on the backs of driver’s 
licenses.205  Although the DPPA would restrict nonconsensual disclosure 
of such data for marketing purposes, the DPPA makes numerous 
exceptions for use by debt collectors, use in connection with a lawsuit, 
and use by a state, federal or local governmental agency “carrying out its 
functions.”206 
Whenever the government develops a new technology, secondary uses 
are sure to follow.  A prime example is Global Positioning System 
(GPS) technology.  The Department of Defense developed the GPS 
system in the early 1970s as a satellite-based positioning and navigation 
system.207  The GPS system transmits precise information about three-
dimensional position, velocity and time, and provides that information 
consistently to anyone equipped with a GPS receiver.208  Additionally, 
military units using GPS can avoid detection because they need only 
receive the satellite signals, rather than transmit a signal of their own.209  
GPS can also provide precise guidance and targeting information for 
missiles.210 
 
 201. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099, 
Title XXX, § 300002(a), § 2721(b)(11) (1994). 
 202. See Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 106-69, 113 Stat. 
986, §§ 350(c)–(d) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(11)–(12)). 
 203. Welsh-Huggins, supra note 197, at C10. 
 204. Morning Edition: Analysis: Missouri Proposal to Include Personal Information 
on Driver’s Licenses Prompts Controversy (National Public Radio, May 29, 2000) 
(Missly Shelton reproting), available at 2000 WL 21480377. 
 205. Id. 
 206. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b). 
 207. DOD/DOT Task Force on Global Positioning System (GPS), Increased Civil 
Participation, § 1.2 [hereinafter DOD/DOT Task Force], available at http://www. 
fas.org/spp/military/program/nav/tf-rpt.htm (Dec. 21, 1993).  For a brief but effective 
explanation of how the GPS system works, see Alan Zeichick, GPS Explained; How the 
Global Positioning System Lets You Know Where You Stand, RED HERRING, Jan. 30, 
2001, at 80–81, available at 2001 WL 2879912. 
 208. Zeichick, supra note 207, at 80–81. 
 209. DOD/DOT Task Force, supra, § 1.4.1. 
 210. 60 Minutes: No Miss: Technology Enabling Missiles to Accurately Hit Targets 
Easily Available to Anyone Around the World (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 26, 1993), 
available at LEXIS, News, CBS News Transcripts. 
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One can easily imagine a wide array of privacy-invasive GPS 
applications, and GPS is on the way to realizing that potential.  GPS 
technology has made headlines for its use in cellular phones and other 
wireless devices.  As of October 1, 2002, the FCC will require cellular 
telephone service networks to locate sixty-seven percent of all cellular 
phone calls within 100 meters, and ninety-five percent of calls within 
300 meters.211  The regulation was intended to allow tracing of 
emergency 911 calls and could have been satisfied by a system that 
required only that cellular providers design systems that tracked the 
user’s location only when dialing 911.212  Instead, cellular providers 
designed systems that broadcast the phone’s location whenever the 
phone is turned on, turning cellular phones into continuous tracking 
devices that could generate substantial revenue from targeted advertising 
and other services.  For example, as a user walked by a department store, 
their cellular phone could ring and deliver an ad for products in that 
store.213  Or wireless users could subscribe to a service that directs them 
to the nearest restaurants or fast-food stores, with the restaurants paying 
the wireless provider for the right to be part of the service.214  At least 
one cellular phone company in England is sending its subscribers special 
offers directing them to pubs in the area from which they are calling.215  
Law enforcement will also benefit from a requirement that cellular and 
other wireless carriers disclose the beginning and end call locations to 
law enforcement agents with wiretap authorization.216 
GPS technology can spawn devices that monitor more than your 
location.  A Florida company holds a patent on what it calls “Digital 
Angel” technology, which can track not only your location, but also your 
vital signs.217  The Digital Angel runs on body heat, and could be worn 
as a bracelet or necklace, or even under the skin.218  A Canadian 
company called AirIQ uses GPS devices to locate missing or overdue 
rental cars, but the company’s Web site reveals far more intrusive 
 
 211. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2000). 
 212. Froomkin, Death of Privacy?, supra note 1, at 1479. 
 213. Hiawatha Bray, Something to Watch over You, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 22, 2001, 
at C1. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Froomkin, Death of Privacy?,  supra note 1, at 1480. 
 216. Id. 
 217. All Things Considered, Commentary: Chipification, (National Public Radio 
Broadcast, Jan. 25, 2001) (Katharine Mieszkowski reporting), available at 2001 WL 
9433350. 
 218. Id. 
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uses.219  “[A] vehicle can be disabled or enabled and the doors can be 
unlocked with the point and click of a mouse.”220  A Connecticut rental 
car company has been using AirIQ to track the driving speeds of its 
rental car customers and issuing fines to customers who speed.221  As of 
July 2001, more than twenty-five customers had called the Connecticut 
Department of Consumer Protection to complain about the speeding 
fines.222 
As the GPS example illustrates, the way in which a data-collection 
system is designed can affect the risk of secondary uses.  Increasingly 
popular automated highway toll collection systems allow drivers to pass 
through toll booths without stopping to pay an attendant or drop change 
in a bin.223  Each vehicle carries a transponder that signals the toll 
collection system when it passes through the tollbooth.  These systems 
could be designed so that they simply deducted the necessary toll from 
the account holder’s toll balance card.  Passing through a toll lane would 
not involve the exchange of any data identifying the owner.224  Instead, 
these systems have generally been designed so that the transponders emit 
unique codes that identify the owner.  The first type of system would 
protect drivers’ privacy, but would require an alternative way to charge 
drivers whose toll-balance cards have insufficient funds.225  One alternative 
would be to photograph the license plate of any car that registers 
insufficient funds as it goes through the tollbooth.  This would be less 
intrusive than the system that identifies the vehicle at each toll, which 
creates a vast database of vehicles’ movements.226 
By choosing a system that can track where and when specific vehicles 
pass through specific toll booths, the government creates a potential gold 
mine of secondary use data for anyone who might someday like to learn 
where you have been.  Law enforcement is already exploiting this new 
source of information.  New York law enforcement agencies have already 
used New York’s E-Zpass records in dozens of criminal prosecutions.227  
Massachusetts authorities recently obtained a court order—over the 
turnpike authority’s objections—requiring the Turnpike Authority to 
 
 219. See Stephanie Stoughton, Watching You Watching Them, BOSTON GLOBE, July 
9, 2001, at C1, available at 2001 WL 3941635. 
 220. AirIQ, Inc., About AirIQ, available at http://www.airiq.com/airiqnewweb/ 
content.cfm?ChapterID=11&PageID=67=58&SegmentID=99 (last visited Nov. 6, 2001). 
 221. Stoughton, supra note 219, at C1. 
 222. See id. 
 223. See Froomkin, Death of Privacy?, supra note 1, at 1529–30. 
 224. Id at 1530. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Ross Kerber, MTA Gives Court Toll-Use Data, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 13, 2001 
at C4, available at 2001 WL 3946550. 
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disclose a motorist’s Fast Lane records for use in a grand jury 
proceeding.228  The judge also refused the Turnpike Authority’s request 
to notify the motorist of the disclosure.229  The Turnpike Authority’s 
Fast Lane program terms explain that it “shall hold all customer account 
information confidential.”230  Other parties interested in automated toll 
collection system data may include such diverse groups as social service 
agents tracking where parents take their children, auto insurers 
estimating how far insured vehicles travel, and divorce lawyers trying to 
expose cheating spouses. 
Grocery store loyalty cards present another example of secondary 
uses.  These cards offer shoppers “rewards” in the form of slightly lower 
prices on certain items when they present their cards at the checkout 
counter.  By presenting the card, however, the shoppers allow the 
grocery store to record every item that they purchase.231  The card not 
only helps the store enhance its inventory and advertising efforts, but 
also to sell its customers’ data to third parties.  Law enforcement may 
also take an interest in such data, as occurred when the Utah Drug 
Enforcement Agency subpoenaed customers’ purchase records to see 
whether suspected drug dealers were buying unusual amounts of 
sandwich bags.232  And health or life insurers may be interested in 
whether a prospective insured buys yogurt or yodels, or whether a 
diabetic buys sugary snacks. 
Similarly, the vast online profiles compiled and shared by Internet 
marketers could find their way into law enforcement’s hands.  Law 
enforcement agents can easily consult any company that kept a Web 
surfing profile on a particular user, and gather all of the clickstream data 
recorded in that profile.  They need only find out a suspect’s IP address—
which can be done in any number of ways, including sending an e-mail 
with an embedded Web bug233—to give them a starting point to search for 
all of that suspect’s clickstream data that profilers have compiled.234 
 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See Matt Beer, Club Cards, Bargains and Privacy in Peril, S.F. EXAMINER, 
Oct. 11, 1999, at D1. 
 232. Carl M. Cannon, Ambushed: A Laundry List of Hot Digital Issues Awaits 
George W. Bush, FORBES ASAP, Feb. 19, 2001, at 47, 49. 
 233. Privacy Foundation, Privacy Watch: New Proposal: Make Web Bugs Visible, 
available at http://www.privacyfoundation.org/privacywatch/report.asp?id=40&action=0 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2002). 
 234. See All Things Considered, Analysis: Internet Privacy in Regards to 
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2.  Inadequate Security of Personal Information 
A second form of unintended consequences flows from the failure to 
protect data adequately.  Hackers pose perhaps the most highly publicized 
security threat to personal information in government and business 
databases.  In early 2001, an organized ring of hackers stole over a million 
credit card numbers from commercial Web sites.235  Operating mostly 
from Russia and the Ukraine, the hackers exploited a well-known 
vulnerability in Microsoft’s Windows NT operating system.236  The 
hackers tried to blackmail businesses by threatening public 
embarrassment if the companies did not pay them or hire them as 
security consultants.237  When companies ignored their demands, the 
hackers posted tens of thousands of credit card numbers online.238  
Microsoft has made free “patches” available online to fix the vulnerability.239  
However, even when software makers identify vulnerabilities, the 
companies using such software often devote insufficient attention to 
ongoing security issues.  According to a former Defense Department 
security officer, “many of the people who hastily constructed Web sites 
during the past few years assumed that putting commercially available 
electronic firewalls around their systems would protect them.”240 
Hackers have also exploited security weaknesses at major credit 
reporting agencies such as Equifax and Experian, stealing consumers’ 
credit report data.241  And the government is not immune from hackers.  
The federal government reported that 155 computers in thirty-two 
federal agencies were temporarily taken over by hackers in 2000, up 
from 110 computers in 1999.242  Officials warned that only about one in 
five hacking incidents are even detected.243  The General Accounting 
Office reported in March 2001 that it had successfully hacked into 
Internal Revenue Service computers which store sensitive data, including 
electronically filed tax returns.244  The GAO report “demonstrated that 
 
Information Collected by Web Sites Without the Knowledge of the User, (National Public 
Radio, Apr. 5, 2000) (interview with Richard Smith, President, Privacy Foundation), 
available at 2000 WL 21470303 [hereinafter, All Things Considered: Internet Privacy]. 
 235. Ariana Eunjung Cha, Hackers Feast on Complacency: Security Holes Well 
Known, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2001, at E1. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer Transactions in Electronic 
Commerce: Why Self-Regulation Is Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REV. 847, 851 (1998). 
 242. D. Ian Hopper, US Government Computers Seen as Prey to Foreign Hacking, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 6, 2001, at A35. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Declan McCullagh, Xenu Do, But Not on Slashdot, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 17, 
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unauthorized individuals, both internal and external to IRS, could have 
viewed and modified electronically filed taxpayer data on IRS computers.”245 
Hacking is not the only way for outsiders to exploit weaknesses in the 
security of personal information.  Companies often make personal 
information available to more employees than necessary, because tighter 
restrictions would increase their costs.  Health care providers, for 
example, allow many employees to access patients’ medical records, 
most of whom have no medical need to do so.246  Though this may allow 
the providers to work more efficiently, it also puts patient privacy at risk.  
One woman who checked into a hospital was promised confidentiality 
regarding her AIDS-related illness.247  Although she shared her condition 
only with her doctors and close family, an acquaintance of the woman 
worked as a secretary at the hospital, and was able to read the woman’s 
medical records on her computer.248  The secretary shocked the woman by 
stopping by to express her concerns about her condition, and told a 
neighbor of the woman’s condition as well.249 
Privacy is also at risk from accidental disclosures by government and 
businesses, even of the most sensitive information.  In an ironic and 
embarrassing gaffe, Justice Department workers trying to assuage 
privacy concerns over Carnivore accidentally disclosed information 
about the supposedly secret team of researchers hired to conduct a 
Carnivore independent review.250  In September 2000, the Justice 
Department posted online a PDF file containing a report by the 
independent review team.251  The document contained thick black bars to 
 
2001, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,42486,00.html (last visited Apr. 23, 
2002). 
 245. Id. 
 246. See CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 102 (1999) (describing 
widespread but routine sharing of patients’ medical information among players in health 
care bureaucracy, including HMOs, insurance companies, hospital workers, pharmacists, 
pharmaceutical companies, and employers); AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 
164–74 (1999) (proposing a variety of ways to restrict unnecessary access to patients’ 
health care information). 
 247. SYKES, supra note 246, at 107. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id.  Ironically, some hospital employees are prone to snooping into each other’s 
medical records, as demonstrated when one hospital administrator became a patient in her 
own hospital, and two hospital employees were caught reviewing her records.  Id. at 106. 
 250. Declan McCullagh, Carnivore Review Team Exposed!, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 27, 
2000, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,39102,00.html (last visited Apr. 23, 
2002). 
 251. Id. 
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conceal the names, telephone numbers, and government security 
clearances of the review team.252  However, “anyone with Adobe-
supplied software—or a text editor and a little bit of time—can view the 
unaltered document.”253  That same day, an unaltered version of the 
document appeared on the Web site of Cryptome.org.254  The unmasked 
information revealed that members of the review team enjoyed a close 
relationship with the Clinton administration and held active top secret 
security clearances.255 
Accidental disclosures of financial and medical information have 
become alarmingly frequent.  In 1997, Experian abandoned an online 
credit report feature after it accidentally misdirected 2000 reports.256  
Drug manufacturers Eli Lilly & Co. and Kaiser Permanente inadvertently 
divulged confidential medical information in misdirected e-mails.257  In 
one of the most egregious examples, someone at the University of 
Montana, apparently by accident, posted detailed psychological records 
of over sixty children and teenagers on its Web site.258  The records 
described information that patients revealed during therapy, as well as 
the therapists’ diagnoses.  University officials said a student or technical 
employee may have accidentally posted these files on the Web site, 
 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id.  The unaltered document is posted on the Cryptome.org Web site, at 
http://cryptome.org/carnivore-mask.htm (last visited July 22, 2002).  The Cryptome.org 
site contained an anonymous poster’s explanation of how the poster noticed the Justice 
Department’s mistake: “Have you seen the DoJ announcement of the Carnivore review 
team? The winning proposal  . . . has most of the names blacked out—but during the 
display, I noticed that the overwritten stuff is at the PDF level; I could briefly see some 
of the names during the screen-painting.”  Posting of Anonymous, to JYA@pipeline.com 
(Sept. 26, 2000), at http://cryptome.org/carnivore-mask.htm.  Cryptome.org explained 
the flaw in more detail: 
  Cryptome has confirmed that digital overwrites in the Carnivore review 
proposal can be unmasked by copying and pasting the PDF text or by using an 
Adobe plug-in, such as Pitstop, to remove overwriting. This cloaking is weaker 
than a similar technique used by the New York Times for cropping text of the 
secret CIA report on Iranian Premier Mossadeq’s 1953 overthrow: 
http://cryptome.org/cia-iran.htm. 
  In addition, the participants’ resume names are pseudonyms of “He” or 
“She,” some of which can be replaced with possible true names by comparison 
with other information in the proposal and online sources. 
Cryptome.org Web site, at http://cryptome.org/carnivore-mask.htm.  The altered document, 
black bars and all, may be found in IIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, TECHNICAL PROPOSAL: 
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL REVIEW OF THE CARNIVORE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION 
COLLECTION SYSTEM, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/pss/iitritechnicalproposal.pdf 
(Sept. 20, 2000). 
 255. McCullagh, supra note 250. 
 256. Budnitz, supra note 241, at 854. 
 257. Charles Piller, Web Mishap: Kids’ Psychological Files Posted, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 7, 2001, at A1. 
 258. Id. 
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where they remained for eight days, until a local newspaper reported the 
story.259  The University’s attorney said that accidental online disclosures of 
private medical information are not unusual and are quickly corrected.260 
Identity theft is a lucrative business for thieves in part because credit 
card companies have not devised an effective way to verify the identity 
of mail-in or telephone applicants.261  Credit card companies could 
minimize the number of innocent victims of identity theft simply by 
restricting the issuance of new cards to verified applicants.262 They 
simply choose not to, because that would hinder their ability to generate 
new customers.263 
Finally, privacy is always threatened by dishonest or corrupt 
individuals with access to personal information held by governments or 
businesses.  Access to the government’s vast information resources can 
be sorely tempting.  Politicians and bureaucrats have used, and will 
continue to use, our personal information for their personal or political 
gain.  Stories of J. Edgar Hoover’s elaborate files are legendary.264  In 
1963, President Kennedy authorized the IRS to send citizens’ tax returns 
to the House Committee on Un-American Activities upon the 
committee’s request.265  In 1970, a former military intelligence agent 
revealed that he had “helped compile a card file on 5000 to 8000 
residents of the St. Paul, Minnesota, area who had opposed the Vietnam 
War.”266  The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil Rights later 
discovered that the St. Paul file was “just one part of a sprawling 
government surveillance project, in which dossiers on hundreds of 
thousands of U.S. citizens were compiled by the Military Intelligence 
 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. GARFINKEL, supra note 73, at 31. 
 262. See id.; see also Miguel Bustillo, Victim Tells Senate Panel of Identity Theft, 
L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2000, at A3 (discussing California bill that would prevent companies 
from sending preapproved credit cards to consumers). 
 263. See GARFINKEL, supra note 73, at 32 (“Ultimately, identity theft is flourishing 
because credit-issuing companies are not being forced to cover the costs of their lax 
security procedures.  The eagerness with which credit companies send out preapproved 
credit card applications creates the risk of fraud.”). 
 264. See, e.g., Orr Kelly, et al., The Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Dec. 19, 1983, at 45 (stating that Hoover’s files corroborated ex-Hoover 
aides’ reports that Hoover “drew on the wealth of defamatory information at his 
fingertips to curry favor with Presidents and other officials and used the bureau’s 
resources to intimidate persons who criticized him or the FBI.”). 
 265. Nothing Sacred, supra note 80, at 2. 
 266. Id. at 12. 
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Command headquarters at Fort Holabird, Maryland.”267  The Wall Street 
Journal Board of Editors quotes President Richard Nixon in 1971 as 
saying he intended to select an IRS commissioner who “is a ruthless son 
of a bitch, that he will do what he’s told, that every income tax return I 
want to see I see, that he will go after our enemies and not go after our 
friends.”268  According to some reports, President Clinton “apparently 
sanctioned the illegal transfer of nine hundred or more FBI files to the 
White House,” possibly for political reasons.269 
Congress and the White House have no monopoly on such abuses of 
power.  The Internal Revenue Service has been plagued with employees 
browsing through the confidential tax records of friends, relatives, and 
celebrities.  An IRS internal audit documented browsing in 1515 cases 
during fiscal years 1994 and 1995.270  One IRS employee was acquitted 
on charges for browsing through tax records of Elizabeth Taylor, Lucille 
Ball, Tom Cruise, Elvis Presley, and other celebrities.271  In another 
case, a Ku Klux Klan member working for the IRS browsed through the 
records of “suspected white supremacists, a family adversary, and a 
political opponent.”272 
Such abuses are not limited to government employees.  A Columbia 
University professor estimates that some emergency room employees 
make more money forwarding patient information to unscrupulous 
lawyers seeking clients than they do from their paychecks.273  And when 
singer Tammy Wynette checked into a hospital in 1995, a hospital 
employee provided details of her medical condition to the National 
Enquirer, which ran a story about her hospitalization.274  By its nature, 
by its desire to be free,275 centralized information is vulnerable to abuse 
by anyone who can access it. 
IV.  FAILURE OF MARKETS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
Part IV examines why the encroachment on privacy often faces little 
meaningful opposition.  If individual consumers, employees, and 
citizens could unite to oppose the encroachment, they might preserve 
 
 267. Id. 
 268. Review & Outlook, Politics and the IRS, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 1997, at A12 
(quoting then-President Richard M. Nixon; see also Twight, Watching, supra note 190, 
at 196). 
 269. Twight, supra note 190, at 196. 
 270. See Stephen Barr, IRS Audit Reveals More Tax Browsing: 23 Fired, Hundreds 
Disciplined by Agency, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1997, at A1. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. SYKES, supra note 246, at 106. 
 274. Id. at 107. 
 275. See generally Barlow, supra note 179. 
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their expectation of privacy.  Numerous factors, however, conspire 
against such solidarity. 
A.  Market Failures 
The ideal of the free market allocating goods efficiently rests on 
assumptions that often prove false in practice.  Markets may function 
inefficiently because of informational asymmetries, unevenly distributed 
bargaining costs, and disparities in bargaining power.276  Moreover, 
market failure is exacerbated by collective action problems that prevent 
customers from uniting to oppose the encroachment.277 
Paul Schwartz characterized the ideal privacy market as one that 
requires companies to engage in “privacy price discrimination.”278  In 
traditional economic terms, price discrimination entails the seller selling 
goods at different prices to different purchasers, depending on the 
elasticity of their demands for her product.279  Privacy price discrimination, 
then, would require companies to differentiate in the way they collect 
and use data about different individuals in accordance with those 
individuals’ preferences about the use of their data.280  The current state 
of affairs does not approach this ideal model.  Instead, due to pervasive 
market failures, companies can buy privacy valuers’ and non-privacy-
valuers’ data for the same price, so they do not pay the true cost of 
personal data.281  The reality, then, is that consumers in the current 
privacy market cannot adequately claim the privacy they desire, and 
therefore cannot mount meaningful opposition to the encroachment on 
privacy. 
 
 276. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 186, at 38–43; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra 
note 186, at 591–93, 595–602; Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy 
and the Subject As Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1395 (2000). 
 277. Schwartz, supra note 132, at 31 (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 153–55 (1997)). 
 278. Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 832 
(2000).   
 279. RICHARD A. POSNER,  305 (5th ed. 1998), (cited in Schwartz, supra note 278, at 
832). 
 280. Schwartz, supra note 278, at 832–33. 
 281. Id. at 833.  For an “analysis of the flaws of combining strong market power 
and price discrimination,” Schwartz directs the reader to Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual 
Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1367, 1384 (1998).  Schwartz, supra note 278 at 833 n.80. 
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1.  Informational Asymmetry 
When buyers know more about certain products or transactions than 
sellers, or vice versa, information is distributed asymmetrically in the 
market.282  Severe asymmetries “can disrupt markets so much that a social 
optimum cannot be achieved by voluntary exchange.”283  For example, 
house buyers are often at a severe informational disadvantage compared to 
house sellers, who are more likely to know of latent defects in the 
house.284  This informational asymmetry leads to market inefficiency, 
because buyers may pay more than homes are worth, or may 
inefficiently refrain from buying out of fear of latent defects.285  Both 
types of inefficiency—overpayment and underparticipation—are 
prevalent in today’s privacy marketplace.  Many consumers participate 
in transactions without any knowledge that merchants are gaining a 
valuable commodity—their personal information or transactional data—
for free.286  Other consumers refuse to buy any goods or services online 
because of privacy fears.  A Forrester Research survey found that in the 
year 2000, privacy fears prevented consumers from spending $12.4 
billion on e-commerce.287 
a.  Lack of Knowledge About Information Collection Practices 
The most basic information deficiency is individuals’ ignorance of 
data collection and surveillance practices.  The free market theory 
presupposes that consumers make informed choices when they decide 
with whom to share certain information.288  The reality, however, does 
not approach this ideal assumption.  Consumers are generally unaware 
of the variety of ways that businesses collect information about them. 
 The world of online profiling offers several examples.  Broadly speaking, 
online profiling can mean collecting information anonymously to create 
targeted advertising, or it can mean merging clickstream data with 
 
 282. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 186 at 43. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id.  States have responded by requiring house sellers to disclose knowledge of 
any latent defects to prospective buyers.  Id. 
 286. Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for 
Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1072–73 & n.202 (1999). 
 287. Anthony Shadid, Crackdown Seen on Customer Databases, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Jan. 8, 2001, at C1. 
 288. See COOTER & ULEN, supra, note 186, at 38–43; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra 
note 186, at 591–96; Eli M. Noam, Ph.D., Privacy in Telecommunications: Markets, 
Rights, and Regulations Part III: Markets in Privacy, reprinted in NEW TELECOM 
QUARTERLY, Fourth Quarter 1995, at 53, available at http://www.tfi.com/ 
pubs/ntq/articles/view/95Q4_A9.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2001). 
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personally identifiable information.289  When you visit a Web site, that 
site can surreptitiously collect data such as your computer’s IP address, 
the type and version of browser you use, your computer type, your 
activities during your last visit to the Web site, and your activities on 
other Web sites.290 The Web site can also track the pages and images 
you download at the site, the time of those downloads, the data you 
enter, the cookies on your computer, and the referring Web page—the 
page where you clicked on the link that sent you to the current Web 
page.291  This clickstream data “is a potentially rich source of information 
about your habits of association, speech, and commerce.”292  Someone 
who reviews your clickstream data can approximate the experience of 
watching over your shoulder while you surf the Web, with the added 
benefit of being able to sort through all your data and select only the data 
interesting to them. 
Web sites gather personal data in a wide variety of ways, many of 
which are unknown to most Internet users.  The most publicized method 
involves cookies—small text files that Web sites write directly to your 
hard drive without your notice or consent.293  Cookies can contain a 
variety of information, such as login or registration information, online 
“shopping cart” information, and your preferences and interests.294  
Cookies are widely used to “facilitate the tracking of specific individuals’ 
activities in order to customize content and advertisement.”295 
Even more difficult to detect than cookies are Web bugs, which are 
part of a Web site’s source code.296  Unlike cookies, which must be 
 
 289. See CDT’s Guide to Online Privacy, Getting Started: Online Tracking FAQ, at 
http://www.cdt.org/privacy/guide/start/track.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2001). 
 290. Id.  Privacy.net has established a demonstration of the information that Web 
sites can collect about you.  When  visited from the author’s home computer, simply by 
clicking on the link to privacy.net/analyze, the site learned the following about the 
author’s computer: IP address; browser type and operating system; the number of Web 
pages visited in the current session and window; the date and time registered; the names 
and versions of various plug-ins installed, such as ShockWave Flash, Real Player, Media 
Player, and Adobe Acrobat; the precise route of “hops” from one IP address to another 
by which the author’s computer found the Web site; the name of the author’s Internet 
service provider; and much more.  See Privacy.net, Privacy Analysis of Your Internet 
Connection, at http://www.privacy.net/analyze (visited March 19, 2001). 
 291. CDT’s Guide to Online Privacy, supra note 289. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Todd R. Weiss, Privacy Group Warns of ‘Web Bugs’, PCWORLD.COM, Sept. 
15, 2000, at www.pcworld.com/resource/printable/article/0,aid,18474,00.asp (last visited 
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physically written to a user’s hard drive, Web bugs hide within the 
HTML code of a Web page.297  They usually exist on the Web page as a 
graphic element about the size of a period, and are therefore invisible to 
users.298  Users are essentially defenseless against these bugs, because 
Internet browsers do not contain any features to disable Web bugs.299  
Despite their small size, these bugs can convey a wealth of information.  
When you surf to a Web page containing a bug, the bug can send the 
following information “home” to the company that planted it: the IP 
address of your computer; the URL of the Web page you are visiting; the 
URL of the Web bug image itself; the time you triggered the Web bug; 
the type of browser you use; and any of the information in the cookies 
already on your hard drive.300  Web bugs can also be planted in e-mail 
messages.301  Such bugs can tell the planter whether and when a message 
was read.302  If a recipient tries to remain anonymous, the Web bug can 
relay the IP address of the recipient’s computer.303  Users cannot stop 
Web bugs from collecting and relaying information about them or their 
computers.304  Their best defense against Web bugs is to use their 
browsers, or other more complicated measures, to block the placement 
of cookies on their computers.305  This at least denies Web bugs access 
to some information about users’ surfing habits.306  In keeping with the 
covert nature of Web bugs, Web site privacy policies rarely disclose the 
use of Web bugs.307 
 
March 12, 2001). 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id.  Internet Explorer and Netscape Navigator both incorporate options to 
reject some or all cookies, but activating these mechanisms can make Web surfing less 
efficient.  Some Web sites either refuse access to users who do not accept cookies, or 
make several attempts to place each cookie—with each attempt causing an intrusive 
dialog box to pop up and ask the user to accept the cookie. 
 300. Richard M. Smith, FAQ: Web Bugs, Privacy Foundation, available at 
www.privacyfoundation.org/education/webbug.html (last visited March 12, 2001). 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id.  That may soon change.  The Privacy Foundation has created a Web bug 
detector that it calls Bugnosis.  See The Privacy Foundation, Bugnosis, at 
http://www.bugnosis.org/ (last visited July 23, 2002).  Bugnosis, which currently works 
only with Internet Explorer, analyzes every Web page that a user visits and alerts the 
user when the program discovers a Web bug.  See Bugnosis, Web Bug FAQ, at 
http://bugnosis.org/faq.html#bugnosis%20basics (last visited July 23, 2002).  Though the 
current version of Bugnosis is merely a detector, the arms race in privacy-related 
technology may well spawn a Web bug “exterminator.” 
 305. See Smith, supra note 300. 
 306. See id. 
 307. See id.  For a demonstration of how a Web bug monitors who accesses a 
particular Web page, visit Webbug 2000s Profile, at http://profiles.yahoo.com/webbug2000.  
Richard Smith of the Privacy Foundation planted a Web bug on this page, but made the 
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Data profilers also use surreptitious programs referred to beneficently 
as “phone home programs” and more critically as “spyware.”  When 
online game player Robert Ellsworth noticed persistent delays while he 
played the game “Everquest: The Scars of Velious,” he suspected that 
personal data was being surreptitiously copied from his computer.  
Using a “sniffer” to monitor all data leaving his computer, he learned 
that the game’s host, a division of Sony Online Entertainment, was using 
a spyware program to collect information about the other applications 
running on his computer.308  These programs are small applications often 
found embedded in software.  They can serve beneficial purposes, like 
automatically verifying that the user has the latest software patches and 
versions.  But they can also “extract information about users, their 
Internet browsing habits or their PC’s configuration, and transmit the 
information to a Web site when the user is online.”309  Companies using 
these programs can gather personal information from you while you surf 
the Web, and sell that information to advertisers.310  Users are usually 
unaware of the covert data collection, though their existence may be 
noted somewhere in the fine print of the “clickwrap” software licenses 
which users almost uniformly ignore.311  Moreover, privacy expert 
Richard Smith observes that it would be difficult for most users to 
understand exactly what these programs do based on a description in a 
program’s contractual terms or privacy policy.312  Software vendors are 
increasingly turning to these types of programs.  The list of past and 
present spyware users includes prominent players such as Microsoft, 
Netscape, RealNetworks, and Intuit.313 
 
bug visible for purposes of illustration.  The Web bug will show the host name and IP 
address of your computer.  Additionally, the page will plant a cookie on your computer, 
albeit a nonidentifying one that cannot be used for tracking purposes because it assigns 
every visitor the same value.  The visible Web bug displays the following message: “*** 
GOTCHA! ***  I know you are at [Host name and IP address], and I just set a non-
identifying cookie in your browser.”  See Smith, supra note 300. 
 308. Howard Millman, How to Keep Vendors from Quietly Violating Your Privacy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2001, at G9. 
 309. Id. 
 310. See All Things Considered: Internet Privacy, supra note 234. 
 311. Millman, supra note 308. 
 312. See All Things Considered: Internet Privacy, supra note 234. 
 313. Millman, supra note 308.  According to a computer security expert quoted in 
the article, “In the hands of a skilled marketer, personal information gathered by a phone 
home applet is a virtual treasure trove.  Stealth data collection is like having a 
telemarketer listen in on the speakerphone while you eat dinner with your family.”  Id. 
FINALSPENCER.DOC 2/11/2020  2:49 PM 
 
896 
b.  Lack of Knowledge About Information Uses 
Even if individuals were aware of all the data that companies collect 
about them, they would still have little idea of how those data are used, or 
by whom.  For example, many Web sites collect names and addresses 
through a variety of techniques, including registration processes and 
sweepstakes offers.314  Such sites do not usually highlight the consequences 
of registering or participating in the sweepstakes.315  Individuals have 
extreme difficulty learning about the secondary and tertiary uses of their 
personal data.316  Yet without specific knowledge about the identity of 
those other companies, and the purposes for which they may use the 
data, individuals cannot intelligently decide what data they should share 
with or withhold from the primary collector.317 
It should not surprise anyone that data collectors are reluctant to 
disclose all the potential uses for the information they collect.  Consumer 
data can be used for many purposes to which consumers probably would 
not agree.318  These uses include, to name just a few: employment and 
health insurance decisions that “exclude or disadvantage genetic or 
medical ‘have-nots’; employment or housing decisions based on 
perceived personality risks; [and] employment or housing decisions 
based on religious preferences.”319  “Data processors have no . . . interest 
in disclosing these uses, . . . because individuals are likely to find them 
so objectionable.”320 
2.  Valuation Difficulty 
Individuals are ill equipped to conduct the types of valuation decisions 
that market theory presumes.  Michael Froomkin coined the term 
“privacy myopia” in reference to the valuation difficulty that consistently 
 
 314. See Murphy, supra note 46, at 2414 (“Many software companies allow a user 
the option of on-line registration of their purchase.  Registration, on-line or otherwise, is 
marketed to the consumer as beneficial for access to support services and product 
updates.  Incidentally, it provides the software merchant with valuable information about 
the consumer.”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. 
REV. 1609, 1625 (1999). 
 315. Schwartz, supra note 314, at 1625. 
 316. Cohen, supra note 276, at 1397; see OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC 
SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 54 (1993) (“[I]ndividuals are 
never aware of the variety of interests that will have access to personal information, nor 
can they imagine all the analytical and strategic uses to which this personal information 
may be put.”). 
 317. Cohen, supra note 276, at 1397. 
 318. Id. at 1398–99. 
 319. Id. at 1399. 
 320. Id. 
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leads consumers to undervalue their personal information.321  The main 
feature of privacy myopia is that, for marketers, aggregating large 
amounts of personal data produces a profile whose value exceeds the 
sum of each individual datum’s value.322  Consumers, however, are 
unaware of the increased value of aggregation.323  So, in each exchange, 
the consumer will value the datum at its marginal value in terms of lost 
privacy, while the merchant will also include the value the datum when 
aggregated with other data in a profile.324  Accordingly, the consumer 
will always assign data a lower value than a merchant, and the consumer 
will always be willing to sell data at a price a merchant will be willing to 
pay.325 
Furthermore, if a consumer assigns a very small marginal value to a 
particular datum, the value of not disclosing that datum will usually be 
lower than the cost of negotiating a confidentiality clause or foregoing 
the entire transaction.326  For this reason, privacy clauses usually will not 
appear unless the data are unusually revealing.327  For a consumer 
buying an appliance, the cost of her address will probably seem trivial 
compared to the cost of not buying the appliance.  Consumers generally 
make their datasharing decisions within the framework of each 
incremental transaction in which they participate, while merchants base 
their practices on the realities and economies of scale of the data 
profiling business. 
Froomkin’s privacy myopia analysis accepts, for the sake of argument, 
the idealized assumption that individuals can assign specific monetary 
values to losses of privacy.  Individuals, however, cannot effectively 
reduce an intangible like privacy to a fixed monetary value.328  Like 
other dignitary goods, privacy has “inherently nonmonetizable dimensions.  
These dimensions may be lost or distorted beyond recognition in the 
translation to dollars.”329  Merchants, however, have no trouble converting 
 
 321. Froomkin, Death of Privacy?, supra note 1, at 1502–04. 
 322. Id. at 1503. 
 323. Id. at 1503–04. 
 324. Id. at 1503. 
 325. Id.; see also Cohen, supra note 276, at 1398 (The “trivial and incremental 
character” of each exchange of data in the consumer context “tends to minimize its 
ultimate effect.  A comprehensive collection of data is vastly more than the sum of its 
parts.”). 
 326. See Froomkin, Death of Privacy?, supra note 1, at 1503–04. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Cohen, supra note 276, at 1398. 
 329. Id. at 1398 (“[M]onetary measures of value do not capture the very real 
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the value of personal data to dollars, because they need not consider the 
dignitary implications.  The merchant values personal data based either 
on the amount for which it can sell that data to a third party, or on the 
benefit it can gain from using that data in its own business.  Thus, in 
many respects the consumer and merchant are speaking different languages, 
yet the structure of the market forces consumers to deal entirely in the 
merchant’s language.  For consumers, something significant is lost in the 
translation, and that loss predisposes them to undervalue their privacy 
interest. 
Finally, even if individuals were equipped with perfect information 
about the uses of their personal data, and could place an accurate 
monetary value on those uses, they still could not assign those data a 
meaningful value.  People are demonstrably bad at estimating future 
value and discounting for present value.330  Yet those are precisely the 
types of calculations required in an ideal market for privacy.  Consider a 
hypothetical proposed transaction whose terms include the sharing of the 
consumer’s name, telephone number, and income level.  Assume that the 
customer has perfect knowledge of (1) the uses the merchant will make 
of that data, (2) the companies to whom the merchant may later sell that 
data, and (3) the possible uses those future buyers might make of that 
data.  Even under these ideal conditions, the consumer cannot attach a 
value to her data without first estimating, based on the probability of 
each use and the number of uses, the value of the uses to which that data 
might someday be put.331  She must next discount that value to its 
present value.332  These types of calculations may be commonplace in 
the corporate world of risk versus benefit analysis, but they are entirely 
foreign to consumers registering their new stereo or registering for a 
Web site. 
3.  Imbalance of Bargaining Power and Bounded Rationality 
In 1971, Arthur Miller observed that an imbalance of bargaining 
power would prevent individuals from successfully claiming their 
privacy.333  Companies, as well as government organizations, generally 
have sufficient leverage to extract the data they want from people.334  
Credit bureaus, for example, can simply deny uncooperative individuals 
 
incommensurabilities that the choice [whether to waive one’s privacy] presents.”). 
 330. Id. at 1397–98. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. 
 333. ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, 
AND DOSSIERS 214 (1971). 
 334. Id. 
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access to the credit economy.335  Individuals are in no position to 
demand promises of confidentiality with regard to their transactional 
data.336  Consumers understand that they cannot persuade a company to 
alter its standard terms.337  Even if some consumers were inclined to 
compare the standard terms for a variety of companies—on the 
assumption that the terms will vary among companies—the careful 
reading and comparison necessary to make an intelligent choice would 
be an arduous task, and its cost might outweigh the benefit of the 
transaction at issue.338  The task is even more difficult where consumers 
must deal not with concrete form contracts, but with nebulous privacy 
policies that can be difficult even to find, let alone decipher.  A recent 
study of sixty financial companies’ privacy notices showed that, on 
average, the notices were written at a third- to fourth-year college 
reading level.339  Literacy experts recommend that materials written for 
the general public be at a junior high school reading level.340 
Behavioral economics offers another reason why individuals do not 
resist standard terms or practices, even when resistance might be the 
rational choice.  Rational choice theory, which underlies traditional law 
and economics theory, is generally understood as either a relatively 
weak “presumption that individuals act to maximize their expected 
utility,” or a relatively strong “presumption that individuals act to 
maximize their self-interest.”341  The burgeoning law and behavioral 
 
 335. Id. at 213–14. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 1173, 1225 (1983). 
 338. Id. at 1226. 
When contracts of adhesion become commonplace, even the individual who 
reads and understands is, and may well perceive himself to be, essentially 
helpless.  The consumer’s experience of modern commercial life is one not of 
freedom in the full sense posited by traditional contract law, but rather one of 
submission to organizational domination, leavened by the ability to choose the 
organization by which he will be dominated. 
Id. at 1229 (footnote omitted). 
 339. MARK HOCHHAUSER, LOST IN THE FINE PRINT: READABILITY OF FINANCIAL 
PRIVACY NOTICES (2001), available at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/GLB-
Reading.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2002).  Hochhauser evaluated the notices by using 
several software packages, including Prose, WStyle 1.6, Grammatik 6, Reader 1.2 and 
Correct Grammar 2.0.  Those programs all calculated readability based on the Flesch 
Reading Ease Score.  Id. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing 
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000). 
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science movement is exploring the ways rational choice theory fails to 
predict behavior.342  “Bounded rationality” is a broad term sometimes 
used to encompass the variety of patterns in which individuals depart 
from the rational choice model.343  Exploring the status quo bias, one 
aspect of bounded rationality,344 Russell Korobkin found that individuals 
negotiating contracts will prefer standard form terms or legal default 
terms over terms they must create themselves.345  This preference, which 
Korobkin also refers to as the inertia theory of contract negotiation,346 
substantially limits individuals’ choices when dealing with standard 
terms or practices that encroach on privacy.347 
Finally, privacy-intrusive industries can do far more than simply agree 
on standard terms and practices.  They can develop technological 
standards for such products as Web browsers or wireless phones that 
preserve the status quo of maximum information disclosure, and even 
leave individuals without effective recourse to other practices or 
standards.348  Individual consumers are powerless in the face of such a 
unified front. Perhaps they could exercise a meaningful choice if they 
acted collectively.  But as the next Section shows, consumers face 
substantial collective action problems. 
4.  Collective Action Problems 
Individuals attempting to preserve their privacy face collective action 
problems.349  Mancur Olson explained that in a large group, each 
member can make only a small contribution to the whole, so there is a 
strong incentive for each to free ride on the efforts of the others.350  In 
the context of consumer privacy, an individual could refuse to deal with 
companies that condition their goods or services on the exchange of 
personal information.  The cost to that individual would be substantial, 
however, and the benefit to the whole group would be quite small.  As a 
 
 342. Id. at 1057–58. 
 343. Id. at 1075–76. 
 344. Id. at 1111–12; Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract 
Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 1583, 1587–88 (1998). 
 345. Korobkin, supra note 344, at 1627. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Schwartz, supra note 278, at 822–23 (citing Korobkin, supra note 344, at 
1587–92). 
 348. Id. at 823 (“Once online industry is able to ‘lock-in’ a poor level of privacy on 
the Web as the dominant practice, individuals may not have effective recourse to other 
practices.”). 
 349. Id. at 822; Schwartz, supra note 132, at 50. 
 350. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 16 (2d prtg. 1971). 
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result, that individual and most similarly situated individuals are likely 
to continue sharing their personal information.  They will wait for others 
to take that strong stand, and hope to free ride on the benefits that flow 
from their action.  The problem, of course, is the few individuals who do 
take a stand and refuse to deal on unfavorable privacy terms cannot 
significantly impact the market. 
Several additional factors inhibit consumers from undertaking collective 
action against standardized terms and practices.  First, with regard to 
online privacy, the fragmented nature of Internet commerce makes 
collective action quite difficult.  Even if a small group of sophisticated 
consumers were knowledgeable about a particular privacy-invasive 
practice, the vast number and relative isolation of Internet users would 
make it difficult to share that information with other interested 
consumers.351  Second, even if all consumers were fully aware of the 
standard privacy practices, they would usually have to either accept or 
reject those terms, rather than negotiate changes.352  The costs of exit can 
be quite high, even in the supposed new frontier of cyberspace, when 
consumers have invested time and resources learning to use a particular 
service, or when exit would require substantial administrative effort, as 
with changing e-mail addresses or Internet banks.353  Third, individual 
consumers are disadvantaged in comparison to merchants because 
individuals do not enjoy the repeat player and other efficiency benefits 
that standard terms provide for merchants.354  For these reasons, rule 
shopping and drafting are more costly for consumers than merchants.355  
Finally, even if a small group of sophisticated consumers united, 
merchants would have little incentive to alter their terms for all 
consumers, and at most would simply discriminate by providing more 
favorable terms to the small group of sophisticated consumers.356 
Two proposed solutions to the collective action problem merit 
attention.  The first involves privacy certification programs, or privacy 
seals, such as TRUSTe, BBBOnLine and WebTrust.357  These programs 
 
 351. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from 
Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 437–38 (2000). 
 352. Id. at 437; Rakoff, supra note 337, at 1224–29. 
 353. Netanel, supra note 351, at 439–40. 
 354. Id. at 438. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. at 438–39. 
 357. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 1693–94; Froomkin, Death of Privacy?, supra note 
1, at 1525–28. 
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involve theoretically independent entities that grant their seals of 
approval only to companies whose privacy polices meet certain baseline 
standards, like notice of what information they collect and how they use 
it, and opportunity to correct errors in the information they collect.358  
Ideally, consumers would then do business only with approved 
merchants.  Different certification programs could even evolve to have 
different levels of privacy protection.  These privacy certification 
programs, however, have several shortcomings.  First, they are entirely 
voluntary.  So far, very few merchants have chosen to participate, and 
there appears to be no pressure to do so.359  The privacy seal organizations 
have also been accused of not cracking down on approved companies 
that violate the certification standards.360  As of December 2000, none of 
the privacy seal programs had ever revoked or suspended a seal, and 
privacy violations by sealholders often come to light through the media 
or advocacy groups, rather than the seal programs.361 
Another proposed solution to the collective action problem involves 
what Lawrence Lessig colorfully referred to as an “electronic butler,” a 
privacy agent to whom you delegate the process of negotiating privacy 
terms.362  The most prominent of these privacy agents is the Platform for 
Privacy Preferences Project, known as P3P™.  The P3P standard would 
allow users and Web sites to express their privacy practices in a standard 
vocabulary.  Each user’s agent could then negotiate with Web sites, 
blocking (or at least warning the user about) sites whose privacy 
practices do not conform with the user’s preferences.363  Ideally, the 
privacy agent saves users the trouble of reading every character of every 
 
 358. Sovern, supra note 286, at 1095–96 & 1096 n.296; TRUSTe, Privacy Seal 
Programs, at http://www.truste.com/programs/pub_how.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2002) 
(stating that TRUSTe awards its trustmark “only to sites that adhere to our established 
privacy principles of disclosure, choice, access, and security.  Furthermore, Web sites 
that display the TRUSTe privacy seal agree to comply with ongoing TRUSTe oversight 
and our alternative dispute resolution process.”); Council of Better Business Bureau, 
Inc., BBBOnline Privacy Seal, at http://www.bbbonline. com/Privacy/ (last visited Apr. 
10, 2002) (A BBBOnLine privacy seal signifies that the online merchant has met 
BBBOnLine Privacy Program requirements in regards to notice, choice, access and 
security regarding personally identifiable information collected online). 
 359. Edmund Sanders, Web Privacy Programs Are Scrutinized: Government May 
Intervene As Self-Regulation Falters, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2000, at C1; see also 
Froomkin, Death of Privacy?, supra note 1, at 1527 (stating that the minuscule 
percentage of firms participating in privacy seal programs “suggests that market pressure 
to participate is weak to nonexistent”). 
 360. Sanders, supra note 359. 
 361. Id. 
 362. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 160 (1999). 
 363. Id.; Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 501, 521 (1999); World Wide Web Consortium, P3P and Privacy on the 
Web FAQ, #1: What Is P3P?, at http://www.w3.org/p3p/p3pfaq.html (last modified Jan. 
29, 2002). 
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privacy policy for every site they visit.  P3P automates that process by 
requiring Web sites to rate their own privacy practices and display them 
in a vocabulary the privacy agents can understand. 
The primary weakness of the privacy agent solution to consumers’ 
collective action problem, however, is that it requires merchants to act 
collectively against their own interests.  The proposed privacy agents 
depend on merchants rating their own privacy practices, and doing so 
accurately.  Merchants have a strong incentive not to provide consumers 
with the means to act collectively to express their privacy preferences.364  
A March 2002 survey by the Progress and Freedom Foundation found 
that four percent of 302 randomly sampled Web sites, and twenty-two 
percent of the eighty-five most popular Web sites, used P3P.365  
According to the World Wide Web Consortium, which developed P3P, 
only 445 Web Sites were using some version of P3P as of July 8, 
2002.366 
P3P has other shortcomings as well.  Without some enforcement 
mechanism, P3P does not guarantee that Web sites will comply with 
their stated privacy practices.367  P3P could even facilitate industry-wide 
lock-in of privacy-invasive practices.368  The P3P vocabulary may also 
be too complicated for many individuals to use.369  Finally, because the 
vocabulary itself will be chosen by P3P designers, not the individual 
users, the P3P protocol risks shifting the power to dictate privacy 
preferences away from individuals.370 
 
 364. Schwartz, supra note 132, at 50–51; Letter from Jason Catlett, Junkbusters 
Corp., to Lorrie Faith Cranor, AT&T Labs (Sept. 13, 1999), reprinted in Junkbusters 
Corp., Technical Standards of Privacy: P3P (Platform for Privacy Preferences), at 
http://www.junkbusters.com/standards.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2002).   
As a product to protect the privacy of the average American shopper, P3P is 
doomed to fail, because such an outcome is not in the commercial interests of 
the organizations who decide whether and how it will be deployed.  P3P has 
become a mirage in the desert of Internet privacy. 
Id. 
 365. WILLIAM F. ADKINSON, ET AL., PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT ON THE 
INFORMATION PRACTICES AND POLICIES OF COMMERCIAL WEBSITES 81 (2002), available at 
http://www.pff.org/publications/privacyonlinefinalael.pdf (last visited July 10, 2002). 
 366. W3C® Platform for Privacy Preferences Initiatives, Web Sites using P3P, at 
www.w3.org/P3P/compliant_sites (last visited July 10, 2002). 
 367. Lessig, supra note 363, at 521 n.65. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace 
Filters, Privacy Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 743, 754–55. 
 370. Id. at 755. 
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B.  Failures in the Political Market 
Charlotte Twight coined the phrase “political transaction-cost 
manipulation,” which she defined as “government officials’ deliberate 
alteration of people’s costs of undertaking collective political action in 
matters that affect the scope of government authority.”371  Twight 
described a useful parallel between the spheres of economics and 
politics.  In the political market, the analog to market exchange is 
“collective political action that alters the role and scope of 
government.”372  In the economic market, transaction costs include the 
costs of obtaining information, negotiating contracts, and enforcing 
contracts.373  In the political market, transaction costs for individuals and 
legislators include the “costs of perceiving, and of acting upon their 
assessment of, the net costs of particular governmental actions and 
authority.”374 
Twight divided the manipulation of political transaction costs into two 
categories: (1) manipulation of agreement and enforcement costs, that is, 
the cost to individuals of reaching and enforcing collective agreements 
on where to draw the line between the governmental and non-
governmental spheres of action; and (2) manipulation of information 
costs relevant to people’s decisions regarding where to draw that line.375  
Both types of manipulation involve what Twight called “contrived” 
political transaction costs.376  I have slightly refined these categories to 
reflect parallels between failures in the political and economic markets.  
The manipulation of political transaction costs can usefully be 
subdivided into three categories: informational asymmetry; leveraging 
superior bargaining power; and incrementalism. 
1.  Informational Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry arises in the political market when laws are 
drafted or promoted in a way that obscures or misrepresents their true 
effects.  The resulting incomplete and inaccurate information deters 
citizens from opposing privacy-invasive laws.377 
 
 
 371. Twight, supra note 187, at 15 & 21 n.1.  See generally Charlotte Twight, 
Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation: An Integrating Theory, 6 J. THEORETICAL 
POLITICS 189 (1994) [hereinafter, Twight, Manipulation]. 
 372. Twight, supra note 187, at 15 & 21 n.1. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Twight, Manipulation, supra note 371, at 190–91. 
 375. Id. at 202, 207; Twight, supra note 187, at 20. 
 376. Twight, supra note 187, at 20. 
 377. Id. at 15. 
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Government can cause information asymmetry by concealing privacy-
invasive provisions in legislation that has nothing to do with privacy.  
We find one recent example in Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”).378  Buried under the heading 
“Administrative Simplification” lay the requirement that the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services “adopt standards providing for a standard 
unique health identifier” for all participants in the health care system.379 
The unique health identifier provision was slipped into HIPAA in a 
last minute amendment filed by Ohio Representative David Hobson.  
Hobson had been pushing “unique personal identifier” legislation since 
1993 at the behest of health and data processing companies and 
associations.380  In fact, Hobson did not write the legislation himself.  It 
was drafted by: 
a coalition of private interests with billions of dollars at stake, including the 
American Health Information Management Association, the American Hospital 
Association, the American Medical Association, the Association for Electronic 
Health Care Transactions, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, Electronic 
Data Systems, International Business Machines Corporation [IBM], and the 
Working Group for Electronic Data Exchange.381 
Hobson’s 1996 reelection campaign received $28,000 from “health, 
insurance, and information interests that favored the legislation.”382  The 
largest contribution came from the American Hospital Association, 
which helped write the legislation.383  While the HIPPA bill was pending, 
two members of co-sponsor Sen. Kassebaum’s staff were negotiating for 
jobs with pharmaceutical and health insurance interests.384  Kassebaum’s 
health policy counsel Dean Rosen was negotiating to become director of 
government affairs in Washington for Glaxo Wellcome, the international 
pharmaceutical company.385 
 
 378. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 26 
U.S.C.). 
 379. Id. at § 1173(b)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(b)(1) (2000)). 
 380. Nothing Sacred, supra note 80, at 34–35.  From 1987 to 1998, Hobson 
received more than $65,000 from the anti-privacy lobby.  Tiffany Danitz, Deceit, Denial 
and the Fate of Privacy, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Aug. 24, 1998, at 14, available at 1998 
WL 9105751. 
 381. Nothing Sacred, supra note 80, at 34. 
 382. Id. at 35. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id.  
 385. Id.  Another Kassebaum aide joined the staff of the Health Insurance Association 
of American soon after the bill passed.  Id. 




Despite its stealthy inclusion, the unique health identifier requirement 
ultimately became public and fell under fierce criticism, prompted in 
part by a 1998 Department of Health and Human Services White Paper 
titled “Unique Health Identifier for Individuals.”386  HHS considered six 
alternatives as “candidate identifiers,” including the SSN and biometric 
identifiers, such as fingerprints and voiceprints, retina and iris scans, and 
DNA.387  The White Paper suggested that the SSN could be improved by 
“begin[ning] with a newborn patient in the birth hospital” where “at 
once the proper authorities would assign a birth certificate number, 
assign an SSN, and assign the health identifier.”388  After the White 
Paper’s release, the New York Times ran a front-page article publicizing 
the unique health identifier plans.389  The health identifier requirement 
“horrified liberals and conservatives alike, with fears that privacy 
ultimately would be breached no matter what precautions were installed.”390  
In response to the public outcry, Vice President Gore announced in 1998 
that the Administration would not promulgate a unique health identifier 
regulation until comprehensive medical privacy protections were in 
place.391  Congress subsequently prohibited the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) from promulgating such an identifier, and 
HHS has no plans to promulgate a unique health identifier.392  Clearly 
the prospect of a universal health identifier faces substantial public 
opposition.  By burying the identifier provision in the midst of HIPAA, 
Congress circumvented that opposition, albeit only temporarily.  
However, not all such misdirection ultimately comes to light. 
Government also creates information asymmetry by mislabeling 
privacy invasive legislation as privacy protective legislation.  A classic 
example is the so-called Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.393  Unwitting 
citizens would never have expected this secrecy act to require banks to 
make permanent copies of their bank records so the government could 
 
 386. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 190. 
 387. Id. §§ III.B & III.C.2. 
 388. Id. § III.A.3. 
 389. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Health Identifier for All Americans Runs into Hurdles, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1998, at A1. 
 390. James P. Lucier, Antiprivacy Plot Is Well-Kept Secret, INSIGHT, Aug. 24, 1998, 
at 16, available at 1998 WL 9105765.  The unique health identifier was originally a key 
part of the Clinton administration’s failed healthcare plan.  Id. 
 391. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 82462, 82566 (Dec. 28, 2000). 
 392. Id. 
 393. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 
1829b, 1951–1959 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2000); 31 U.S.C. § 321, 5311–5314, 
5316–5322 (2000)). 
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use them in “criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings.”394 
2.  Leveraging Superior Bargaining Power 
Government also leverages its vastly superior bargaining power by 
tying anti-privacy legislation to government benefits.  In 1935, when 
Congress sought to create a SSN for all Americans’ retirement accounts, 
it secured passage by tying the SSN plan to popular programs such as 
“needs-based old-age assistance, unemployment compensation, and 
maternal and child health services.”395  In the throes of the depression, 
people were unlikely to oppose crucial social welfare programs to 
prevent the creation of a national database identifying every American.  
By linking these programs together, proponents of the SSN plan vastly 
increased the political transaction costs of opposing the plan. 
Congress subsequently leveraged its bargaining power to ensure the 
SSN’s widespread use as a de facto national identifier.396  In theory, no 
one need obtain a SSN until they begin working and paying into the 
Social Security fund.  In practice, however, Congress has effectively 
removed any element of choice, by conditioning income tax deductions 
for children upon parents registering their children for SSNs.397 
3.  Incrementalism 
Finally, government proceeds with many privacy-invasive programs 
incrementally, eroding peoples’ expectation of privacy gradually.  
Incrementalism has been most effective and pervasive in the exponential 
growth of the SSN.  In 1935, officials assured Americans that the SSN 
would be used exclusively to identify their Social Security accounts.398  
 
 394. 12 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2000) (stating purpose of recordkeeping requirement). 
 395. Twight, supra note 187, at 18. 
 396. See Twight, supra note 190, at 169.  For a discussion of the SSN’s 
proliferation, see infra § III.B.3. 
 397. See I.R.C. § 151(e) (2000) (prohibiting dependent deductions unless return 
includes dependent’s identifying number); I.R.C. § 6109(d) (stating that individual’s 
social security account number shall be used as identifying number for purposes of 
Internal Revenue Code).  Congress originally required parents to provide SSNs for 
children by age five in order to obtain the deduction.  Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1524, 100 
Stat. 2085 (1986).  Congress lowered the age to two years in 1988, one year in 1990, and 
required SSNs for all dependent deductions, regardless of age, in 1994.  Pub. L. No. 100-
485, § 704(a), 102 Stat. 2343 (1988); Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11112, 104 Stat. 1388 
(1990); Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 742(b), 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
 398. H.R. REP. NO. 106-996, pt. 1, at 23 (2000). 
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In many gradual steps, however, the federal government has ensured the 
widespread use of the SSN as a personal identifier by federal agencies, 
state government, and the businesses sector. 
In 1943, President Roosevelt issued an executive order requiring 
federal agencies to use the SSN to identify personnel, rather than have 
each agency develop its own identification system.399  The 1960s saw 
three federal agencies adopt the SSN as an identifier: the Civil Service 
Commission in 1961; the Internal Revenue Service in 1962; and the 
Department of Defense in 1967.400  The 1970s saw the SSN extended to 
a variety of government benefits programs.  In 1972, the federal 
government began issuing SSNs to legally admitted aliens and to anyone 
receiving or applying for federal benefits.401  Aid for Families with 
Dependent Children and the food stamp program began using the SSN 
for eligibility purposes in 1975 and 1977, respectively.402  In 1976, state 
governments began using the SSN for tax purposes, public assistance 
identification, and driver’s licenses.403  Use of the SSN expanded even 
more dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s.  In the 1980s it spread to the 
school lunch program, interest-bearing bank accounts, commercial 
motor vehicle operator’s licenses, blood donor identification, and the 
National Student Loan Data System.404  In the early- to mid-1990s its use 
extended to Department of Veterans Affairs payments, jury selection, 
worker’s compensation claims, professional licenses, commercial driver’s 
licenses, occupational licenses, marriage licenses, and death certificates.405 
As suggested by public outcry over the National Data Center plan406 
and the universal health identifier,407 the government could not have 
taken these steps in one fell swoop.  Instead, by proceeding incrementally, 
the government has enabled itself to create SSN-based dossiers that track 
people from cradle to grave, through SSN-identified federal databases 
describing their educational experiences, medical histories, employment, 
 
The SSN was created in 1935 for the sole purpose of tracking workers’ 
earnings so that Social Security benefits could be calculated upon retirement or 
disability. . . . 
  Because a unique SSN is assigned to each individual, the number is 
commonly used as a personal identifier, although it was never intended for this 
purpose. 
Id.; accord Twight, supra note 187, at 19–20. 
 399. GARFINKEL, supra note 73, at 20. 
 400. Id. at 33. 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. at 33–34 
 406. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 407. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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financial transactions, public benefit receipts, social security benefits, 
and death certificate.408  The federal government has thus achieved 
cradle to grave tracking via a de facto national identifier. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The foregoing observations provide strong arguments for implementing 
broad structural measures empowering individuals to claim their own 
privacy.  Others have proposed many such structural measures, so I do 
not treat them in great detail here.  I shall point out, however, how these 
observations about the expectation-driven conception of privacy bolster 
the arguments for structural reform. 
The most sweeping structural measure would be establishing a Privacy 
Commission as part of the federal government.409  A Privacy Commission, 
even without enforcement powers, would go far toward eliminating the 
informational, bargaining power, and collective action obstacles to 
individuals’ claiming their privacy.410  The Commission’s primary power 
over industry and government would derive from investigating and 
publicizing privacy-invasive practices, and recommending legislative or 
regulatory solutions where appropriate.  This would help alleviate the 
informational asymmetry that puts individuals at a disadvantage, and the 
Commission could employ its substantial bargaining power to persuade 
industries to revise privacy-invasive form contracts and technological 
standards.  The Commission would also give individuals a powerful 
voice to help them overcome their collective action problems.  Finally, 
the Commission could help deconstruct the internalization of privacy-
invasive practices by publishing studies showing how conceptions of 
privacy have changed over time, and perhaps how they might change in 
the future.  Adding enforcement powers would enable the Commission 
to deter specific violations and encourage pro-privacy practices.  Even 
 
 408. See generally Twight, supra note 190. 
 409. See Schwartz, supra note 132, at 65–68 (proposing a United States Data 
Protection Commission). 
 410. See id.  
A United States Data Protection Commission would assist numerous social 
groups and draw the attention of the legislature and the public to the 
weaknesses of current laws.  By fulfilling these tasks, the data protection 
agency would keep the legislature, citizens, and the business community aware 
and active as information technology continues to utilize different kinds of 
personal information in new ways. 
Id. at 66. 
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without enforcement powers, the Commission could wield influence by 
referring illegal practices to the appropriate enforcement authorities. 
In the realm of consumer privacy, privacy advocates have long called 
for legislative or regulatory requirements that industry adopt opt-in 
rather than opt-out approaches to collecting and using personal 
information.  A meaningful opt-in requirement would combat information 
asymmetry by mandating plain language notice of what information 
merchants collect and how they will use it.  That would give consumers 
far greater knowledge of the consequences of sharing their data.  An 
example mentioned above shows that the opt-in approach is dramatically 
more effective than opt-out.  The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 
(DPPA) prohibited states from releasing drivers’ personal information for 
certain purposes without the drivers’ consent, but allowed states to 
presume such consent unless the drivers opted out.411  A 1999 
amendment changed the DPPA’s protection scheme to opt-in; states 
could not release the information without the drivers’ express consent.412  
In the month after Ohio implemented its opt-in law, only a handful of 
drivers opted in.413  In the consumer context, the opt-in approach would 
shift the informational burden to merchants, who would have to inform 
consumers about the possible uses of their personal information, and to 
justify their requests with specific articulations of why they want 
consumers to opt in.  Merchants are far better suited to shoulder the 
informational burden, since they already have mechanisms in place to 
exchange information with every one of the customers.  The 
alternative—requiring every consumer to research each merchant’s 
policies and practices—wastes consumers’ limited resources. 
Consumer privacy legislation should further combat information 
asymmetry by requiring every business to obtain the consumer’s express 
consent each time it wishes to share personal data about that consumer 
with a third party.414  Businesses could send notice via e-mail or post 
card, giving consumers the option to grant or deny permission via e-
mail, Web site, or toll-free telephone number.  The notices would have 
to disclose the identity of the third party.  Although some consumers are 
dimly aware that their data is shared, most have no conception of how 
pervasive the data web is.  Merely receiving notice of each instance of 
 
 411. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 300002(a), 
108 Stat. 1796, 2099 (1994). 
 412. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-69, § 350(c)-(e), 113 Stat. 986, 1025 (1999). 
 413. Welsh-Huggins, supra note 197, at C10. 
 414. See Schwartz, supra note 314, at 1673–74 (proposing legislation prohibiting 
sharing personal information for purposes not “compatible with the original collection” 
without the individual’s formal consent). 
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data sharing would raise awareness among consumers, and the 
opportunity to deny permission would add to the process an aspect of 
meaningful consent that is notably absent today. 
Building on the foregoing proposals, a more dramatic step would be to 
prohibit companies from discriminating in their terms or conditions 
against consumers unwilling to share personal information.  The DPPA 
provides a legislative model for this approach.415  A 2000 amendment 
prohibits states from “condition[ing] or burden[ing] in any way” the 
issuance of a driver’s license, title, or registration to obtain express 
consent to disclose information.416  Some will protest that this step 
would deprive willing individuals of the right to sell their privacy.  But it 
may be the only effective way to remedy the problem of incrementalism, 
in which consumers perceive the benefits of each individual transaction 
as outweighing the cost of surrendering one bit of personal information. 
Preventing merchants from discriminating against consumers who 
deny consent would also test the industry claim that most people actually 
enjoy the benefits that flow from consumers’ sharing personal 
information, such as targeted advertising and improved service.  If the 
claim is true, then many individuals will still share their data voluntarily, 
while those more sensitive about their privacy will find it far easier to 
protect.  On the other hand, if the claim is false, then very few people 
will share their data voluntarily, and the legislation will have helped 
people choose long-term privacy over other short-term benefits. 
Merchants, especially Internet merchants, will complain that such 
legislation would drastically increase their costs, which they would have 
to pass on to consumers.  That argument assumes that the sharing of 
personal data is an integral part of their business.  However, the current 
trade in personal data may be more properly understood as an attempt to 
generate an income stream to supplement the merchant’s primary 
business.  And if restricting the trade in personal data would be fatal to 
some data profilers and Internet companies supported almost entirely by 
data-sharing revenues, that would demonstrate that we have been 
subsidizing inefficient business models by allowing a trade in personal 
data. 
 
 415. See Froomkin, Death of Privacy?, supra note 1, at 1535 (explaining that to 
prevent opt-in consent from becoming part of a standard form or terms, law would have 
to prevent repercussions for failure to convey consent). 
 416. See Pub. L. No. 106-346, § 309(e), 114 Stat. 1356 (2000) (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 2721(e) (2000)). 
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Workplace privacy presents an even greater need for structural reform.  
Employers wield far more bargaining power over employees than do 
merchants over consumers.  As discussed above, employers have taken 
full advantage of the expectation-driven nature of privacy by preemptively 
defeating employees’ expectation of privacy.  Lawmakers could alleviate 
the imbalance of power by depriving employers of the tools they use to 
lower expectations.  For example, new laws could restrict the circumstances 
in which employers could monitor employee e-mail or Internet usage, 
and could also prohibit employment policies or contracts from stating 
that the employer will monitor such usage.  A privacy commission could 
play a useful role in this context, perhaps by requiring employers to 
issue employee privacy notices similar to workplace safety notices 
required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 
More important than specific solutions, however, may be the 
recognition that privacy is a matter of expectations.  The privacy battle is 
to be won or lost not by theoretical argument about the nature of privacy, 
but by concrete action and advocacy designed to affect society’s 
expectations.  Today, some of the most important work is done by 
watchdog and advocacy groups working to expose and deter encroachment.  
We may best serve the cause of privacy not though abstract arguments 
about what ought to be private, but through careful examination of not 
only our current expectations of privacy, but also how and why those 
expectations have changed.  For under the expectation-driven conception 
of privacy, what we expect to be private today will determine what the 
law will protect as private tomorrow. 
Finally, the shocking September 11 terrorist attacks threaten to skew 
the already tenuous balance between privacy and security in favor of the 
latter.  Now, more than ever, the immediacy of the danger may blind 
decisionmakers to the widespread and potentially irrevocable effects of 
each seemingly limited encroachment on privacy.  The new USA 
PATRIOT Act417 has already expanded substantially the government’s 
ability to conduct surveillance on its citizens.  To take one example, the 
USA PATRIOT Act has expanded the types of Internet usage 
information that any “governmental entity”—not merely a law 
enforcement agency418—may review without obtaining a warrant or 
court order.419  They need only serve an administrative subpoena,420 
 
 417. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 
U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C., 50 U.S.C.).    
 418. Id.  The Electronic Communications Privacy Act does not define the term 
“governmental entity” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2000). 
 419. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56 § 210, 115 Stat. 283 (2001). 
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grand jury subpoena, or trial subpoena upon an electronic communication 
service provider.421  The newly authorized information includes the time 
and duration of any user’s Internet sessions, the user’s Internet Protocol 
address, and any credit card or bank account number that pays for the 
user’s Internet service.422  Indeed, even without new legislative or 
executive measures, many businesses disregarded their own privacy 
policies to disclose information to law enforcement in the days following 
the attacks.423  Congress justified the USA PATRIOT Act as necessary 
to “deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the 
world, [and] to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools.”424  But its 
effect on privacy expectations will reach beyond terrorists and other 
legitimate subjects of law enforcement investigations.  Indeed, anyone 
who uses the Internet must expect the possibility that a government 
agency may learn their credit card or bank account numbers, their IP 
address, and dates and times of their Internet sessions.425 
Those who make law and policy must include long-term privacy 
consequences in their decision-making equation.  Measures that could 
diminish privacy are often justified by reference to superficially more 
concrete goals such as efficiency, crime deterrence, and security.  To the 
extent that policymakers balance privacy against those goals at all, they 
may consider only the most immediate privacy implications.  For 
example, adopting a national identification card to promote security at 
airports and borders426 might appear to have only minimal privacy 
 
 420. The general standard for review of an administrative subpoena is extremely 
lenient.  Courts must enforce an administrative subpoena if the inquiry is “within the 
authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite, and the information sought is 
reasonably relevant.”  United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).  The 
Morton Salt court explained that an agency’s investigative authority is analogous to a 
grand jury’s authority, and that the agency “can investigate merely on suspicion that the 
law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.”  Id. at 642–43. 
 421. 18 U.S.C. §2703(c), as amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 210. 
 422. Id. 
 423. Stephanie Stoughton, Poll: Firms Relaxed Privacy Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 
8, 2001, at C4, available at 2001 WL 3956333 (reporting that fifty-nine percent of 
airlines, hotel chains, travel agencies, rental car companies, and other travel-related firms 
surveyed said they relaxed their own privacy policies to aid law enforcement officials in 
the wake of the terrorist attacks). 
 424. USA PATRIOT Act, pmbl. 
 425. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56 § 210, 115 Stat. 283 
(2001). 
 426. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Fear National ID Cards?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 13, 2001, at A23.  See generally Ross Kerber, ID, Please: Idea of National Identity 
Card System Gains Momentum in Wake of Attacks, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 2001, at C1. 
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implications, because airlines routinely ask passengers for identification,427 
and people must present a passport or other identification at most border 
checkpoints. 
Such a narrow view, however, ignores the widespread unintended 
consequences of a national identification card.  Secondary uses of such a 
card would multiply exponentially, as have uses of the social security 
number.428  A national identification system would require a national 
database and a single identifier—a number or a biometric, like a 
fingerprint or facial image—for each cardholder.  Such a centralized 
infrastructure would present irresistible secondary uses, both in and out 
of government.  Welfare agencies could include relevant information in 
the database to prevent people from fraudulently obtaining benefits.  
Law enforcement could merge criminal records into the database.  The 
database could hold confidential medical data, and serve as the universal 
health identifier proposed in the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996.429  In the business sector, financial institutions 
and merchants could insist upon presentation of a valid national ID card 
as a condition to extending credit or conducting transactions with 
individuals. 
Such a centralized database of personal information is ripe for abuse, 
regardless of the government’s attempts to keep the information 
confidential.  To list just one egregious example, during World War II, 
the government used supposedly confidential Census Bureau information to 
identify Japanese-Americans for incarceration in internment camps.430  
Moreover, as discussed above, governmental officials are not above 
using confidential information for personal or political gain,431 and even 
confidential IRS information is vulnerable to abuse from within and 
hacking from without.432 
Each incremental expansion of the national identification card’s use 
would erode individuals’ expectation of privacy.433  The requirement to 
 
 427. See Airlines Demanding ID, But Not for Security, 22 PRIVACY J., Nov. 1995, at 
1, 1. 
 428. See discussion supra notes 187–192 and accompanying text. 
 429. See discussion supra notes 378–392 and accompanying text. 
 430. John J. Miller & Stephen Moore, A National ID System: Big Brother’s Solution 
to Illegal Immigration, at n.14 (Cato Policy Analysis No. 237, 1995), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa237es.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2002). 
 431. See discussion supra notes 264–269 and accompanying text. 
 432. See discussion supra notes 270–272 and accompanying text. 
 433. Although some sections of the USA PATRIOT Act will sunset at the end of 
2005, the sunset provision does nothing to forestall this erosion.  It is true that Congress 
will have to renew those few provisions that expire in 2005.  USA PATRIOT Act § 224 
(2001).  But in the intervening four years, people’s expectations of privacy may diminish 
in response to more aggressive law enforcement practices.  Expectations will not 
spontaneously bounce back simply because the technical authority for the intrusions 
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present our virtual dossier would almost inevitably expand—from 
airports, to welfare offices, to banks and merchants.  So would the types 
of data that those dossiers routinely exposed to scrutiny—from our 
physical characteristics to our addresses to our confidential medical and 
financial information.  With each step in this process, we would become 
increasingly used to the idea that our personal information is free for 
inspection by others.  Exposure of personal information would shift 
toward the norm rather than the exception. 
As the national ID card example demonstrates, government must 
recognize that its actions and initiatives have far reaching effects on 
expectations of privacy.  If government succumbs to short-term fears 
and ignores the long-term privacy consequences of its actions, the 
inevitable secondary uses and unintended consequences of sweeping 
anti-terrorism initiatives will make privacy a collateral casualty of the 























expires.  Instead, the diminished expectations of privacy will present Congress with only 
minimal resistance to renewing these intrusive provisions. 
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